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Developing Countries and GATT/WTO
Rules: Dynamic Transformations in Trade
Policy Behavior and Performance
Chiedu Osakwe*
I. INTRODUCTION:
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE RULES-BASED
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM
What factors explain the shift to policy reforms and
liberalization in developing countries1 after the 1940s “special
and differential” approach to GATT rules and disciplines? How
did this reform-driven behavior affect the trade performance of
developing countries, as well as the agenda and functioning of
the WTO? In describing the legal relationship of developing
countries to GATT rules and disciplines, Robert Hudec
observed that GATT developing country members never agreed
to accept the same disciplines as developed members, but
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(chiedu.osakwe@wto.org). The author acknowledges with appreciation the
contributions and comments of several colleagues: Robert Teh, Dayong Yu,
Petra Beslac, Joan Apecu, Jan-Yves Remy, Santiago Wills, Nadiya Nychay
and Terry Townsend. The arguments expressed in this paper, for which the
author alone is responsible, are not intended, directly or indirectly, to
represent either the views and positions of the WTO Secretariat or its
Members. This paper is based on the presentation made at the American
Society of International Law Conference (ASIL), International Economic Law
Interest Group (IEcLIG): “International Economic Law in a Time of Change,”
University of Minnesota Law School, Minneapolis, 18–20 November 2010, on
the occasion of the re-issue of Robert Hudec’s book, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM, (Cambridge University Press, 2011).
1. For the purpose of this study and in keeping with the WTO standard,
“developing countries” are defined as all countries and separate customs
territories minus “developed countries,” which include Australia, Canada,
EU27, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the United
States. This standard is in keeping with the fact that developing country
status in the WTO is by self-designation and that least-developed countries
(LDCs) are recognized as a legal sub-category of developing countries. See
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Who are the developing countries in the WTO?,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm (last visited Feb. 20,
2011).
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sought exceptions from the GATT obligations and code of
behavior. The GATT’s legal relationship with developing
countries consisted primarily of a history of demands for special
status, which badly served developing countries and
compromised the most-favored-nation (MFN) obligation. This
argument correctly characterized the period analyzed by
Hudec. While strains of this special and differential approach
have persisted, significant changes have occurred. Developing
countries trade policy behavior has evolved to demonstrate an
offensive reformist behavior, but also defensive postures,
averse to rigid constraints on policy flexibility. How did
developing countries create their own momentum for
liberalization and reform?2 Their liberalization impulse is
explained by the combination of domestic pressures to respond
to crises and national development priorities, compliance with
systemic trading rules, adjustments to commitments from
successive rounds of trade liberalization, and implementation
of domestic reforms pursuant to WTO accession negotiations.
The analysis of developing country recently-acceded Members
(RAMs) indicates extensive trade reforms and optimization of
WTO-rule compliance. This trade policy behavior has resulted
in stronger trade performance and resilience, relative to
founding Members. In addition, a positive relationship exists
between domestic reforms complying with WTO rules and trade
performance. Specifically, analysis indicates that the
liberalization momentum is driven by complex dynamic
interactions between domestic priorities and compliance with
systemic trade rules, linked to degrees of flexibility. These
relationships are in question in the Doha Round. This article
concludes the Doha Round is indispensable for modernizing the
rules, sustaining trade reforms, integrating developing
countries into the rules-based system, and reinforcing the WTO
as a global public good for international cooperation.
A. DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ RELATIONSHIP:
COMPLEX AND EVOLVING
Professor Hudec still challenges our thinking in positive
ways. Many of the questions he asked and issues he addressed
remain highly pertinent today. His 1987 foresight on the
increased
importance
of
developing
countries
was
2. J. Michael Finger, Introduction to ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 19 (Cambridge University Press
2011).
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extraordinarily prescient. Even at the time it was obvious to
him that the role of developing countries in the trading system
was bound to attract increased attention. The role of developing
countries in the trading system and their relationship with
GATT rules is still at the heart of the central and unresolved
questions in the on-going Doha Round. Despite the evidently
changing balance in global trade and economic relations
between the traditional post-World War II trading powers and
the emerging economies on the other, the Hudec thesis remains
relevant to integrating developing countries into the rulesbased Multilateral Trading System and managing the complex
relationship between developed and developing countries.
GATT/WTO developing Members (countries and separate
customs territories) have had a complex and developmentmediated relationship with the rules of the trading system over
a period of more than sixty years. As correctly described by
Hudec, the relationship of developing countries with GATT
rules started from essentially a “parity of obligation.”3 This
relationship, however, metamorphosed, deviating to an
exemption ramp, with requests from developing countries for
special and differential treatment coupled with their refusal to
accept the same disciplines or undertake the same concessions
and commitments as developed members. A range of reasons
accounted for this behavior. The preliminary question is, what
is the current reality? Has the relationship changed? If so, how
should the current relationship of developing countries to the
GATT/WTO rules be described? Next, it is necessary to identify
the factors that improve understanding of the reformist and
trade-liberalizing policy behavior of developing countries from
the mid-1980s. What is the effect of this behavior on the actual
trade performance of developing countries and on the
contemporary agenda and functioning of the WTO? Finally, it is
relevant to ask whether there is a “liberalization momentum”
amongst developing countries. These legal and policy questions
will remain relevant to the relationship between developed and
developing WTO Members in the trading system for the
foreseeable future.
The relationship of developing countries to GATT/WTO
rules remains in complex and dynamic evolution. The nature of
this relationship will be affected by the reaction of developed
Members. However, although developing countries accept
3. HUDEC, supra note 2 at 24.
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commitment to the rules-based Multilateral Trading System
and are firmly set on domestic reforms and trade liberalization,
strains of the exemption orientation remain, in addition to a
more nuanced advocacy for differentiated treatment of
categories of developing countries at different levels of trade,
finance and development. The latter approach advocates a
“concept of differentiation and policy flexibility, not to divide
countries, but for greater inclusiveness.”4 In other words, as
advocated, while there is acceptance of the necessity of binding
rules and disciplines, different categories within the developing
country group seek differentiated treatment, even while
reaffirming commitment to the preservation of core systemic
trade rules. On one hand there is a commitment to systemic
trade rules, domestic reforms, and trade liberalization, and on
the other hand, advocacy to rule and policy flexibility for
development reasons.
What factors explain the drive for reform and trade
liberalization since the mid-1980s, in contrast to the restrictive
and protectionist policies in the post–World War II era? In the
post-World War II period, most economies, including
developing countries had high levels of effective protection.
Average tariffs were in the 20–30% bracket. In many
developing countries, high tariff levels were combined with
quantitative restrictions and exchange controls. These
restrictive measures reflected policy objectives that favored
infant industry protection, import substitution, and capital
controls.5 These policies essentially shielded domestic industry
from competition. From the mid-1980s, a liberalization impulse
was evident in the trade policy behavior of developing
countries. A core group of developing countries embarked on
significant domestic reforms and trade liberalization. Why was
this so? It is argued that this liberalization impulse amongst a
core group of developing countries, initiated from the mid1980s onwards and sustained into the 1990s and 2000s is
explained by the combined factors of domestic pressures to
respond to crises and national development priorities,
4. Shree Servansing, Coordinator, African, Caribbean and Pacific Group
of States (ACP), Remarks at Workshop on Recent Analyses of the Doha Round,
Summing Up and Roundtable Discussion: How Can Policy-Makers Use These
Analyses And What Other Information Do They Need? (Nov. 2, 2010)
(transcript on file with author).
5. Bernard Hoekman, Changing Developing Country Trade Policies and
WTO Engagement (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 8210,
2011).
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compliance with systemic trading rules, adjustments to
commitments from successive rounds of trade liberalization,
and implementation of domestic reforms pursuant to WTO
accession negotiations. The analysis of the trade policy
behavior of developing country RAMs is demonstrative.
Developing country RAMs have undertaken extensive trade
reforms and optimized WTO-rule compliance. This trade policy
behavior has resulted in their stronger trade performance and
resilience, relative to founding WTO Members. Specifically,
analysis indicates that the drive for reform and trade
liberalization momentum is driven by complex dynamic
interactions between domestic priorities and compliance with
systemic trade rules, linked to degrees of flexibility.
It is obvious that a complex range of external and domestic
factors interacted to explain the domestic reform and tradeliberalizing behavior of developing countries, from the GATT
era (dating from the mid-1980s). This argument differs from
the more classical position that, “the GATT played, at best, a
marginal role in the trade policy reform process in developing
countries” and that, “domestic policy reform is still primarily a
function of autonomous decisions by developing country
governments.”6 While there may be the appearance of
autonomy, strategic decision-making is hardly ever
autonomous; they tend to be constrained by both external and
internal factors. It is argued that decisions for domestic reforms
and trade opening in particular have always combined domestic
and external factors, and take account of rules of the
Multilateral Trading System. Domestic reforms and trade
liberalization of developing country RAMs confirm this
proposition rather than being an exception to it. Of equal
significance is that the external effect of the influence of
systemic trading rules has been reinforced by the cumulating
jurisprudence of the trading system is strong evidence under
the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO.
B. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE RULES OF THE
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM
Based on a foundation of non-discrimination, GATT rules
have continued to evolve, reinforced and qualified by WTO
jurisprudence. The GATT established a legal framework for

6. Id. at 2.
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reciprocal reduction of tariffs. A “code of behavior”7 was agreed,
which rested on three central principles: i) protection should
rest on tariffs and elimination of non-tariff barriers; ii) periodic
negotiations aimed at a gradual reduction of existing tariff
levels; and iii) MFN treat the trade of all GATT Members
equally. Within these rules, developed-country governments
achieved a very substantial reduction of trade barriers in the
twenty years from 1947. Developing country members of the
GATT refused these disciplines. They sought exceptions and
although the history of the GATT’s legal relationship with
developing countries begins with essentially “parity of
obligation,” it ended up primarily with demands for special
status. This relationship became a “one-sided welfare
relationship” in which developing countries are excused from
legal disciplines while developed countries are asked to
recognize a series of unilateral obligations, based on economic
need, to promote the exports of developing countries.8
This relationship, described as “form without substance,”
relaxed disciplines, rather than sharply focusing the trade
disciplines to constructive and beneficial uses, and has badly
served developing countries more than it has assisted them.9
For instance, it has been convincingly argued that part of the
explanation for asymmetric outcomes in trade negotiations
under the GATT resulted from developing countries’
negotiating strategies, such as the insistence on special and
differential treatment and refusal to engage in the reciprocal
exchange of liberalization commitments.10
Hudec’s observations about the relationship of developing
countries to GATT rules and disciplines described the reality of
the period which he studied. Three examples are illustrative.
First, in 1965, Part IV of the GATT (Trade and Development
Section) was added by the Protocol Amending the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The purpose was to increase
trade opportunities for developing country Members by
providing them with special and differential treatment. Article
XXXVI:8, Part IV, of the GATT 1994 incorporated into WTO
law the principle of non-reciprocity in trade negotiations
between developed and developing country Members. This
7. HUDEC, supra note 2 at 23.
8. Id. at 24.
9. Id. at 99.
10. Rajesh Chadra et al., Developing Countries and the Next Round of
WTO Negotiations, 23 WORLD ECON. 431, 433 (2000).
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meant that developed country Members would not seek, nor
would developing country Members be required to make,
concessions inconsistent with their development, financial, and
trade needs; developed country Members were not to expect
reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade
negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to
the trade of developing country Members. Provisions in Part IV
suggested measures by developed Members to promote
development.11 There were priority measures identified to
eliminate barriers to trade in products of particular export
interests to developing country Members12 and also identified
measures to improve conditions of access to world markets of
primary products of interest to developing country Members.
Second, in 1979, the GATT contracting parties adopted the
Enabling Clause.13 The Enabling Clause further elaborated the
non-reciprocity principle and special and differential treatment.
It provided for preferential market access treatment in
merchandise trade to developing countries, including leastdeveloped countries (LDCs), without according such treatment
to other Contracting Parties, as an exception to GATT Article 1.
In Paragraph 1, the Enabling Clause provided that,
“Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of the General
Agreement, contracting parties may accord differential and
more favourable treatment to developing countries, without
according such treatment to other contracting parties.”14 This
provision applied to preferential tariff treatment by developed
contracting parties to products originating from developed
countries within the Generalized System of Preferences
framework; differential and more favorable treatment
regarding non-tariff measures pursuant to GATT negotiated
instruments; regional or global arrangements entered into
amongst less-developed contracting parties for the mutual
reduction or elimination of tariffs; and special treatment for
LDCs amongst developing countries in the context of any
general specific measures in favor of developing countries.
Paragraph 5 provided that developed countries should not
expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade
11. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Art. XXXVII, Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
12. Id. para. 1.
13. Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries, para. 2(c), L/4903 (Dec. 3, 1979), GATT
B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203 (1980).
14. Id. para. 1.
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negotiations to reduce or eliminate tariffs and other barriers in
the trade of developing countries.
In 2010, more than thirty years later, in the Doha Round
negotiations, a proposal was tabled for a waiver from the
obligations under Paragraph 1 of GATS Article II to enable
Members to provide preferential treatment to services and
LDCs’ services suppliers without the same treatment to other
Members. The proposed draft waiver was formulated as the
services equivalent of the 1979 Enabling Clause. As proposed in
the operative section, WTO Members would decide that, “The
obligations imposed under Paragraph 1 of Article II of the
GATS are hereby waived to the extent necessary to permit
Members to provide preferential treatment to the services and
services suppliers of least-developed countries without
according the same treatment to like services and service
suppliers of all other Members provided that any such
treatment shall be granted immediately and unconditionally to
like services and service suppliers of all least-developed
countries.”15
Third, beyond the mid-1980s, in the period from when
domestic reforms and trade liberalization were initiated and
sustained into the 1990s to the present, strains of special and
differential treatment have persisted. In the 2001 Ministerial
Declaration launching the Doha Round, the mandate for the
launch of the negotiations prescribed conditions for reflecting
special and differential treatment for developing and least
developed countries in the negotiations for agriculture,16 nonagricultural market access (NAMA),17 and to ensure that
special and differential treatment was made integral to WTO
Agreements18 and reflected across the entire Doha Round

15. JOB/SERV/18: Preferential Treatment to Services and Services
Suppliers of Least-Developed Countries (proposed draft waiver decision
submitted by the delegation of Zambia) (on file with author).
16. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November
2001, para. 13, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1; 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha
Declaration].
17. Id. para. 16.
18. Id. para. 44 (“We reaffirm that provisions for special and differential
treatment are an integral part of WTO Agreements. . . . We therefore agree
that all special and differential treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a
view to strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and
operational. In this connection, we endorse the work programme on special ad
differential treatment set out in the Decision on Implementation-Related
Issues and Concerns.”).
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negotiations and Doha Work Programme.19 In the ongoing
modalities draft texts for agriculture and NAMA, there are
extensive provisions for special and differential treatment.
The current trade policy of special and differential
treatment still approximates Hudec’s description of these
provisions as “form without substance.” Special and differential
treatment provisions have not advanced beyond so called soft
law, good faith, and best endeavor. It is not foreseen that a
right or an international law obligation would emerge from
special and differential treatment provisions, such as
unreciprocated and preferential treatment.
The more recent mutations of the strain of the special and
differential treatment approach show critical differences from
its more orthodox 1960s strain. In its present form, there is no
longer either refusal of or ambivalence toward the core rules
and disciplines of the system by developing countries, although
there are qualifiers for policy and rule flexibility. The
institutional setting of the rules-based Multilateral Trading
System and the core rules are accepted. Developing countries
accept to be bound by the rules and invoke the Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU)20 to enforce their rights in
the balance of rights and obligations. Furthermore, a critical
difference to the 1960s is that developing countries are
convinced and committed to domestic reforms and trade
liberalizing behavior. Systemic trade rules are used to lock in
these reforms and to justify trade-opening behavior. The
current approach to special and differential treatment has an
underlay of pragmatism and realism which acknowledges the
foundation of non-discrimination, and that special and
differential treatment will not be upgraded to the status of a
right or obligation in international law. Systemic trade rules
are used to argue and justify domestic reforms and liberalizing
trade policy behavior as necessary means for developing
19. Id. para. 50 (“The negotiations and the other aspects of the Work
Programme shall take fully into account the principle of special and
differential treatment for developing and least-developed countries embodied
in: Part IV of the GATT 1994; the Decision of 28 November 1979 on
Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries; the Uruguay Round Decision on
Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries; and all other relevant
WTO provisions.”).
20. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].

OSAKWE - Final Version

374

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

4/22/2011 6:21 PM

[Vol 20:2

countries to achieve growth, poverty reduction, development,
and multilateral objectives such as the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). In the post-World War II period,
however, developing countries caused self-harm because
domestic reform was low on their agenda, domestic industries
were largely shielded from foreign competition, and trade
policies were protectionist.
A frequent question, now more of historical than
contemporary value, is how did the orientation to the 1960s
strain of exemption orientation and special and differential
treatment emerge? From the establishment of the GATT in
October 1947 (as a Protocol of Provisional Application), both
developed and developing countries had sought degrees of
freedom from the disciplines that the GATT sought to impose.
For instance, the Europeans were sympathetic to the infantry
industry and reconstruction arguments for protection because
of their post-World War II needs for reconstruction and
development. The United States had its own exception
positions to the disciplines, such as quantitative restrictions on
agricultural imports and anti-dumping provisions.21 Between
developed and developing countries, non-reciprocity flourished
primarily because it was an easy route: developing countries
could maintain the posture of vigorous representation with
their home governments; and, it was the easy way out for
developed country governments. For the latter, it was a costfree answer—a concession that developed countries could
make, without having to go through the unpleasant business of
asking legislatures for real trade liberalization or real
resources.22
Although the core non-discrimination principle remains the
foundation of the rules-based Multilateral Trading System, the
rules and core values have been in dynamic adjustment in
relation to the 1940s baseline. The baseline legal framework of
the GATT was not to discriminate and to engage in reciprocal
reduction of tariffs. The code of behavior rested on three central
principles: i) MFN—non-discrimination and the commitment to
treat the trade of all GATT Members equally; ii) tariff
protection and the elimination of non-tariff barriers; and iii)
periodic negotiations for the gradual reduction of existing tariff
levels.
21. HUDEC, supra note 2 at 31–32.
22. Id. at 190–91.
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While non-discrimination has remained an infrangible
principle and has been strengthened through WTO Article XII
accession negotiations, there has been an evolution in the
substance and application of the rules over time. This evolution
has been development-mediated with adjustments for notions
of fairness. Currently, the core values and principles of the
trading system revolve around:
 non-discrimination (provided for in MFN and national
treatment);
 progressive trade liberalization through successive
rounds of trade negotiations;
 predictability of the rules through binding of
commitments and transparency of measures;
 fair competition and undistorted trade and the
prevention of cheating, through the rules against the
use of trade distorting subsidies, dumping, and
safeguards;
 development and incentives for promoting domestic
economic reform through calibrating the balance
between rules and flexibility, targeted technical
assistance and capacity building, and Aid for Trade;
and
 the DSU that ensures that the rules provided in covered
WTO Agreements are enforceable if the benefits of a
Member are nullified or impaired through measures or
policies by any Member that are inconsistent with the
rules.
In contrast to the 1960s, developing countries reaffirm
commitment to and invoke the rules and the WTO DSU to seek
enforcement of their rights, pursuant to the rules. They are
also demonstrating reformist and trade-liberalizing policy
behavior. Simultaneously, however, there is strong advocacy for
development-friendly
trade
rules
that
institutionally
differentiates developed from developing countries, with intragroup differentiation of developing countries, in the
Multilateral Trading System. This differentiation is proposed
in two ways: first, for account to be taken of the different
development, financial, and trade needs in the developing
countries’ group; and, second, for systemic trade rules to
provide scope for policy flexibility, such as through waivers,
longer transition periods for adjustments, and exemption for
LDCs prior to graduation from LDC status. The complexity of
the issues involved has been compounded by a moment in
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history when emerging economies from the developing country
category are growing faster than the traditional trading
Members and have become the locomotives for growth and
recovery from crisis in the global economy. The issues
associated with differentiated treatment of developing
countries and the form and substance of the development
dimension of trade rules, are under discussion amid intensive
negotiations in the Doha Round. The position of the developed
WTO Members, such as the United States, is that the
proposition that the world’s most powerful trading nations
could play by a set of rules that gave them “unfettered access to
global markets” without appropriate reciprocity lacked
realism.23 Such a system was neither a basis for a sustainable
trading system, nor for an outcome in the Doha Round.
C. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CHANGING COMPOSITION AND
VARIED INTERESTS
The composition and role of developing countries in the
Multilateral Trading System is complex and evolving. The
group is heterogeneous. It is neither a monolith nor is it
unitary. Its interests are mixed, uncertain, and in some cases,
divergent. The diverse and variable composition of the
developing country group in the trading system explains, in
part, why the trade policy behavior of the group as a whole has
also been complex and difficult to fully or accurately describe.
There were twenty-three Governments at the signing of the
GATT Final Act on October 30, 1947. Twelve were developing
countries.24 Currently, at the WTO there are 153 Members, of
which approximately 120 are developing countries.25 This
significantly increased number of developing countries from
1947 is diversely composed. In the developing country category,
there are the LDCs, which refer to fifty countries legally
defined by the United Nations as LDCs, of which thirty-two are
23. Michael Punke, Deputy United States Trade Representative and
Ambassador to the WTO, Statement at the Informal Meeting of the Trade
Negotiations Committee Heads of Delegation (Nov. 30, 2010) (transcript
available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/statement
-ambassador-michael-punke-trade-negotiations-committee).
24. Brazil, Burma, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, India, Lebanon, Pakistan,
Southern Rhodesia, Syria and South Africa were among the founding
members. See Press Brief, WTO, Fiftieth Anniversary of the Multilateral
Trading System (Jan. 1, 1998), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/
min96_e/chrono.htm.
25. See supra note 1.
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WTO Members and twelve are in the process of WTO accession.
The rest fall into the broader category of “developing countries.”
As earlier noted, the question of who is a developing country
has always been at issue.26
In the Doha Round, various developing country negotiating
coalitions have emerged that provide snapshots of the diversity
of the trade and economic interests of developing countries in
the Doha Round. For instance, in the agriculture negotiations,
several groups are operative. These include the Commodities
Group; the Cotton-4; the G20 of Members committed to
ambitious liberalization in agriculture; the G3-33 with
defensive orientations in agriculture; the G-90; the LDCs; the
RAMs; small and vulnerable economies (SVEs-Agriculture);
and the Tropical and Alternative Products Group. Although the
Cairns Group of agricultural exporters includes developed
Members such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, its
other Members are developing countries. For instance,
Mauritius, a Member of the African Group is designated a
developing country, but participates in the Doha Round
Agriculture negotiations with developed Members in the G-10,
with high levels of domestic support and low ambition levels in
the agriculture negotiations. This is in contrast to South Africa,
another developing country member of the African Group,
participating with other developing countries in the G-20
group, with low levels of domestic support and high levels of
ambition in the agriculture negotiations.
In the Negotiating Group on NAMA, the industrial
products group, there is a range of comparable developing
country groups. These include the African Caribbean and
Pacific (ACP) countries, African Group, Mercosur (Common
Market of the Southern Cone), G-90, LDCs, SVEs-NAMA,
RAMs, Low-income economies in transition, NAMA-11,27 and
“Paragraph 6” countries.28
26. HUDEC, supra note 2 at 160.
27. NAMA-11 is a group of developing countries seeking flexibilities to
limit market opening in industrial goods trade. See, e.g., Statement, NAMA11, NAMA-11 Trade Union Statement on the Non-Agricultural Market Access
(NAMA) negotiations at the WTO (June 26, 2006), http://www.ituccsi.org/IMG/pdf/NAMA_tU_statement.pdf.
28. The “Paragraph 6” countries area group of developing countries with
less than 35% of non-agricultural products covered by legally bound tariff
ceilings. These countries have agreed to substantially increase their binding
coverage. However, they want to exempt some products. The reference applies
to paragraph 6 of the first version of the NAMA Draft Modalities Text, later
paragraph 8. WTO Negotiating Group on Market Access, Fourth Revision of
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Developing Countries: Trade Performance
Strains of special and differential treatment persist.
However, the relationship of developing countries to GATT
rules from the mid-1980s is evolving. This changing
relationship, manifested in reformist and trade-liberalizing
policy behavior and stronger commitment to the rules-based
trading system, has been reflected in stronger trade growth and
performance trends. With the exception of those developing
countries that have been tentative on reform or adversely
affected by domestic turmoil, the trend of strong trade growth
performance from the mid-1980s has been sustained to the
present, taking account of periods of global financial and
economic crisis.
In the data reviewed, using 1987 as the base year,29 Figure
I and Figure II show the trend of trade growth of developing
countries, developed countries, and the world. Figure I shows
that, from 1948 to 1987, the trend of trade growth of developing
countries was in line with that of developed countries for most
of the period. In the early 1980s, there was a jump for
developing countries (in 1980 at 32%), although this was not
sustained. However, as indicated in Figure II, developing
countries started to outperform developed countries from the
early nineties (1993). This trend was temporarily arrested
during the Asian financial crisis in the late nineties (1999).
Developing countries trade declined in 1998 (-8%) and 1999
(-5%), while the developed countries still maintained modest
growth (2% in 1998 and 8% in 1999).30 From 2002, however, the
trade growth of developing countries continuously outpaced the
trade growth of developed countries. Global trade was
adversely affected by the 2008–09 global economic and
financial crisis. The decline of trade of developing countries was
a bit smaller (-22%) than that of developed countries (-24%).

Draft Modalities for Non-Agricultural Market Access, TN/MA/W/103/Rev.3
(Dec. 6, 2008).
29. See infra Annex 1 for trade value and growth rate.
30. Year-on-year percentage change.
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TRADE PERFORMANCE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Figure I: Growth of merchandise trade: 1948-1986
(Index, 1987=100)
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Figure II: Growth of merchandise trade: 1987-2009
(Index, 1987=100)
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Developing Countries

Developed Countries

World

Charts in Figure III show the growth in merchandise trade
share of developing countries from the baseline of 1948. In
1948, developing country merchandise trade share was 39%
compared to 61% for developed countries. Developing country
merchandise trade share declined to 31% by 1987 compared to
the continued increase to 69% in developed country
merchandise trade. This period from 1948 to 1987 was the
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period of restrictive trade and protectionist policies pursued by
developing countries. The mid-1980s marked the period when
developing countries embarked on serious and sustained
domestic reforms, trade-liberalizing policy behavior, and the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiation that was
launched in 1986. In 1995 (the coming into force of the WTO),
developing country share of merchandise trade had reversed a
negative trend to register at 35% and this further increased to
42% in 2009, compared to developed countries share of
merchandise trade at 65% in 1995 and 58% in 2009.
Figure III: Share of merchandise trade; 1949, 1987, 1995 and
2009 (Billion dollars and percentage)
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Recent analysis indicates the positive performance of
developing countries is set to continue. In the second quarter of
2010, China passed Japan to become the second largest
economy in the world after the United States. Current analysis
indicates that developing countries’ improved growth
performance is not simply a reflection of strong performance by
China and India.31
II. DOMESTIC REFORM PRESSURES
In the 1960s and 1970s, protectionist policies held sway in
most developing countries. Trade protection reflected
prevailing trade policy for “industrialization” through import
substitution and selection of national champions. Trade
protection for infantry industry was championed as a viable
policy path to industrialization.
In the 1980s, developing countries embarked on massive
economic and policy reforms, including of their trade regimes.32
This was the era of the “new liberalizations.”33 The reforms
were imperative. They were responses to the crises in the
decade of the 1980s.34 Several severe economic shocks played a
role in generating these reforms. From 1979 to 1981, the global
economy had been subjected to the second oil shock.35 The
inability of Mexico to service its debt, signaled the debt shock.36
The United States increased interest rates, as part of monetary
policy designed to reduce double-digit inflation.37 This was
followed by the global recession, marked by negative growth,
high unemployment rates and low consumer confidence. The
shocks delivered to the global economy in this period generated
31. Otaviano Canuto, Recoupling or Switchover? Developing Countries in
the Global Economy, in THE DAY AFTER TOMORROW: A HANDBOOK ON THE
FUTURE OF ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 33 (Otaviano
Canuto & Marcelo Guigale eds., The World Bank 2010).
32. I.M.D. LITTLE ET AL., BOOM, CRISIS, AND ADJUSTMENT: THE
MACROECONOMIC EXPERIENCE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 271–72 (1993).
33. Id.
34. Although most of the 1980s reform had been initiated as a response to
the pressures of crises in the period, Colombia was the exception, where
reforms were implemented without the pressures of crises. Sarath
Rajapatirana et al., Political Economy of Trade Reforms, 1965–1994: Latin
American Style 20 WORLD ECON. 307, 330 (1997).
35. SARATH RAJAPATIRANA, THE TRADE POLICY OF DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: RECENT REFORMS AND NEW CHALLENGES 5–6 (2000).
36. Id.
37. Id.
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crises in many developing countries, with the exception of oil
exporters.38 These crises, as with several others, combined with
and played on domestic weaknesses and vulnerabilities. To
counteract the crises arising from these shocks, developing
countries in the decade of the 1980s, embarked on economic,
including trade policy, reforms and liberalization.39 Surveys
and analysis have suggested links between crises and reform.40
It has been argued, based on the evidence, that many of the
countries that opened up in the 1980s, did so as a reaction to
and in the wake of macroeconomic crises.41 The 1980s crises
had been preceded by the consumption splurge and the
investment booms of the late 1970s. In combination, the severe
economic shocks of the period, the recession and domestic
vulnerabilities, generated pressures for reform and rebalancing. The objectives were to improve developing countries’
trade and economic performance, increase their access to
developed country markets, and restore growth. The reforms
that followed were sustained through the 1990s and have
continued to the present, with newer versions of reform to
respond to current economic challenges.
Several factors were at play in initiating and sustaining
the 1980s reforms. Research and analysis laid the foundation
and played a central role. There was the initial research
preceding these reforms.42 Empirical based studies built on this
initial research.43 These provided further impetus establishing
the necessity for sustaining these reforms and trade
38. Id.
39. Id. at 5–6, 13.
40. See generally Mariano Tommasi & Andrés Velasco, Where Are We in
the Political Economy of Reform? 13–18 (Dep’t of Econ. Univ. of Cal., L.A.,
Working Paper No. 733, 1999) (discussing some of the analysis as to whether
or not crises actually cause reform).
41. MICHAEL BRUNO, DEEP CRISES AND REFORM: WHAT HAVE WE
LEARNED? 8 (1996).
42. See, e.g., JAGDISH BHAGWATI, ANATOMY AND CONSEQUENCES OF
EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES (1978); Anne O. KRUEGER, LIBERALIZATION
ATTEMPTS AND CONSEQUENCES (1978) (discussing economic liberalization
policy).
43. See, e.g., JEFFREY D. SACHS & ANDREW WARNER, ECONOMIC REFORM
AND THE PROCESS OF GLOBAL INTEGRATION (1995); David Dollar, Outwardoriented Developing Economies Really Do Grow More Rapidly: Evidence from
95 LDCs, 1975–1985, 40 ECON. DEV. AND CULTURAL CHANGE 523 (1992);
Sebastian Edwards, Trade Liberalization Reforms and the World Bank, 87 AM.
ECON. REV. 43 (1997).
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liberalization. Broadly, the starting point of the research
results and conclusions was that domestic policy reform and
trade liberalization were necessary for growth. The neutral
incentives, arising from the macroeconomic fundamentals of
fiscal stability, low inflation and competitive, market-oriented
exchange rates were necessary, as a basis for managing
meaningful trade policy and promoting growth.
Other factors were of equal significance particularly the
directions of law and regulation for education, human capital
development and infrastructure development.44 In the ensuing
period, further contributions were made by leading academics
and researchers. They emphasized the greater relative
importance of selective intervention (and not so much neutral
incentives), technology and solid institutional frameworks for
the conduct of industrial policy in accounting for growth.
Academics in this strain argued that economic growth was not
so much attributable to neutral incentives, as to targeted public
investments and selective promotion of and intervention in
specific sectors.45 There were much more than neutral
incentives and fundamentals at work.
Although academics accorded varying weights to different
factors, more important, in this debate, was the convergence on
the necessity for domestic policy reforms, trade policy reforms,
and openness. There is a good discussion in the literature of the
so called revisionist argument rejecting and/or modifying the
theoretical position that trade liberalization, conditioned on
neutral incentives fully explain rapid trade (export) growth and
high GDP growth rates (such as was the case in East Asia).46
What was not questioned, however, was the necessity for
domestic and trade policy reforms on the part of developing
countries. What remains at issue and with continuing echoes in
44. See, e.g., Chiedu Osakwe, 10th Joseph Mubiru Memorial Lecture,
Poverty Reduction and Development: The Contribution of Trade,
Macroeconomic and Regulatory Policies (Dec. 14, 2001) (discussing some of
these issues in relation to Uganda and concluding that a range of factors are
essential to achieve trade growth and development).
45. See, e.g., ALICE H. AMSDEN, SOUTH KOREA AND LATE
INDUSTRIALIZATION (1989); Dani Rodrik, The Limits of Trade Policy Reform in
Developing Countries, 6 J. ECON. PERSP. 87 (1992) (discussing some of the
limits of trade liberalization policy); ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET:
ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN
INDUSTRIALIZATION (1990).
46. See, e.g., Rajapatirana, supra note 35, at 6–11.
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the WTO today is the correct balance between domestic and
trade policy reforms, on the one hand, and sectors for selective
intervention and protection. Discussions are on-going regarding
the degree of accommodation and balance between trade
opening, on the one hand, and domestic regulations, safeguards
and protection, on the other.
The momentum for trade liberalization was sustained by
the shift to flexible exchange rates in 1984, and its wide
acceptance and use by developing countries in the 1990s. Trade
liberalization has been associated with the shift from fixed to
flexible exchange rates. There was a greater recognition by
developing countries that the content of domestic policies
created the underlying conditions for economic and financial
stability. Domestic policies had a strong relationship and were
reflected in exchange rate policies. The recognition and
acceptance of the relationship between domestic policies and
exchange rate policies allowed developing countries to become
more competitive internationally. In this period also, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank
enhanced policy support and technical assistance for trade
liberalization in developing countries. For instance, trade policy
conditions were elements in IMF standby programs.47 Although
in contrast World Bank support declined, in the 1990s, because
of the decline in lending for structural adjustment.
From the late 1990s onward, there was an inchoate and
strong dynamic at play, for poverty reduction and development,
as an objective of domestic reforms and trade opening in
developing countries. The origins of this dynamic were both
domestic and externally influenced. From the late 1990s, lowincome developing countries were engaged in the process of the
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), emerging from the
World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework.48 This
locked low-income countries into an intensive process of
domestic coordination to design strategies to reduce poverty
and achieve their cardinal development priorities. The first
47. See generally ROBERT SHARER ET AL., TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN IMFSUPPORTED PROGRAMS (INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 1998).
48. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers describe the macroeconomic,
structural, and social policies and programs that a country will pursue over
the following years to promote growth and reduce poverty. Int’l Monetary
Fund, Factsheet: Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, 1 (Sept. 2010),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/prsp.pdf.

OSAKWE - Final Version

4/22/2011 6:21 PM

2011]DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE GATT/WTO RULES 385
generation of PRSPs encompassed measures and strategies for
implementing reforms in the areas of investments, private
sector development, agriculture, health, and education. In the
subsequent generation of these PRSPs, from 2000 onwards,
trade priority areas of action were mainstreamed into several of
these PRSPs (or national development plans), using the vehicle
of the Integrated Framework (IF) for trade-related technical
assistance to LDCs.49 The IF process, although external to
these low income economies, combined with and strengthened
the domestic reform efforts in this developing country group for
closer institutional association with the rules-based
Multilateral Trading System, and more closely secure them to
the ideas of trade liberalization for addressing their
development priorities. The IF and its later metamorphosis into
the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) provided significant
benefits that reinforced the notion of the gains from trade, the
benefits of trade openness and the value of trade liberalization.
A specific point that was highlighted in the trade
mainstreaming exercise was that trade policy was not standalone. It requires complementary domestic policies that deliver
effective results. These necessary companion policies include
infrastructure, education, competition and investment,
information technology, intellectual property rights protection,
governance and the rule of law, and effective leadership.
In 2000, world leaders agreed to eight MDGs to be
achieved by 2015. One of the MDGs is the reduction of poverty
by half by 2015.50 It is acknowledged that achieving this goal
will depend, in part, on the contributions from trade opening
and the elimination of trade distortions both in developed
country markets, particularly in agriculture, elimination of

49. The IF (now referred to as the Enhanced Integrated Framework) is an
inter-agency framework to assist trade development for LDCs, by six agencies
namely, the International Trade Centre, UNCTAD, UNDP, World Bank, IMF,
and the WTO, with representatives of developed and LDCs. (The author
chaired the Inter-Agency Working Group, IAWG, that was formerly used to
manage the Integrated Framework from 1999 to 2002). See generally SubCommittee on Least-Developed Countries, Report on the Seminar by the
Integrated Framework Core Agencies, WT/LDC/SWG/IF/15/Rev.1 (Apr. 17
2001) (detailing the 2001 IF seminar).
50. United Nations Millennium Resolution, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000) (describing other goals as well, such as achieving
universal primary education and promoting gender equality).
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distortions in developing country markets, and improvements
in South-South trade.
Academic research reinforced the drive for trade reform
and the development dynamic in trade liberalization. This
research also exercised a strong influence that systemic trading
rules, particularly for the new Doha Round should be fair and
that development should be at the core of the Doha Round. The
case was made before the launch of the Doha Round that
fairness and comprehensiveness should be two governing
principles. More specifically, the areas identified for
liberalization focus, with potential benefits for developing
countries, were agriculture, manufactures, and services (with
appropriate regulatory frameworks and funding for small and
medium enterprises and under-served groups). Research also
focused on trade and liberalization in factors of production
(services areas, like labor mobility), non-tariff barriers (antidumping and countervailing duties), and promoting effective
competition policy and trade facilitation. This research also
underlined the necessity for domestic-level policies to
accompany trade liberalization at the multilateral level in
trade rounds. In summary, research as presented,
demonstrated that in rounds of trade liberalization, “[m]ore is
at stake than simply the exploitation of the gains from
comparative advantages. Trade is vital to the dynamics of
successful development.”51
III. EXTERNAL REFORM PRESSURES—THE CHALLENGE
OF EVENTS
Trade policy formulation and behavior have always been
subject to the effects of both municipal and external political
developments. The 1980s–90s was a period of revolutionary
change in the international political economy. Latin America
returned to democracy. New leaders emerged, such as
President Gaviria in Colombia. The political and economic
environment shifted in Brazil, Argentina and Peru. On
December 31, 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed; the culmination
of a dramatic process that effectively began on January 19,
1990. Market economics took greater hold with the dramatic
collapse of the Soviet Socialist experiment with command
51. Joseph Stiglitz, Two Principles for the Next Round or, How to Bring
Developing Countries in from the Cold, 23 WORLD ECON. 437, 452 (2000).
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economies. Lessons were drawn from the collapse of command
economies, central of which was that this model of economic
governance was unworkable. The inefficiency and failure of
state planning were laid bare. There were wholesale
conversions to the market economy. The transition from
socialism to capitalism at the end of the twentieth century is
one of the most significant events in the world economy since
industrialization. These changes affected about twenty-five
percent of the global population.
The economics of transition from centrally planned
economies to the market economy was closely examined
because, amongst other reasons, the process was unique. There
were a range of important studies on the variability of the
individual transition economies and the lessons drawn in the
period roughly ranging from 1991 to 2000.52 Transition
economics emerged as a branch of economics. Important lessons
were drawn that related, inter alia, to issues of creating and
strengthening institutions, public and private ownership,
intellectual property rights, market institutions and the price
mechanism, financial reform and capital movements, public
finance, competition policy, trade, growth and development, the
role of government, and the rule of law and governance.
Transition indicators were suggested. Central to these were
liberalization
(reduction
of
trade
barriers,
prices),
macroeconomic stabilization (inflation control, fiscal discipline
and sustainable balance of payments), institutional reforms,
and legal and policy reforms (to secure property rights,
privatization, promote competition, the rule of law and
transparency in government).
There was appreciation of the enormous difficulties in
implementing the transition to the market economy. There
were scholarly disagreements over issues of speed and pace
with regard to liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization.
For instance, there were disagreements on the speed of transfer
of assets from the state to the private sector. However, there
were self-evident conclusions. The transition from the
inefficiencies and gross failures of communism and centrally
52. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, TRANSITION, THE FIRST TEN YEARS:
ANALYSIS AND LESSONS FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET
UNION (2002); Int’l Monetary Fund, Transition Economies: An IMF
Perspective on Progress and Prospects (Nov. 3, 2000), http://www.imf.org/exter
nal/np/exr/ib/2000/110300.htm.
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planned economies had achieved notable successes and yielded
important lessons for domestic reforms and significant benefits
for welfare, growth, and political freedoms. Central planning
had failed and the market economy had prevailed. These
fundamental lessons exercised decisive effects on the balance of
debates in the global political economy. In particular, the
lessons from the failure of communism and central planning
were particularly salutary on developing countries. The lessons
drawn convinced those countries still in doubt about the
correctness and the power of the market economy over central
planning and protection. The jury had returned a clear verdict.
These lessons reinforced the commitment and drive of
developing countries to domestic reforms and trade
liberalization.
Is the transition complete? Are there lessons still being
drawn? At various times, a group of about thirty-four countries
have been identified as transition economies.53 Of these,
twenty-six embarked on rigorous rules-based market-oriented
WTO accession negotiations: sixteen successfully concluded
WTO membership negotiations54 and ten are still negotiating
membership.55 Transition economics remain of active interest,
and the transition to the market economy for the countries
involved is a work in progress. The terms of WTO accession for
these countries and the lessons from WTO Article XII
negotiations are a key factor driving the liberalization
momentum in developing countries.
There has been a succession of financial and economic
crisis since the 1930s depression. However, the 2008–09 global
financial and economic crisis has been the most severe since
the 1930s. This was an event that raised doubts, in some
quarters, about market economics and certainly made evident
53. Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia,
Hungary, Laos, Latvia, Lithuania, Republic of Kosovo, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz
Republic, Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland,
Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Viet Nam.
54. Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Croatia, Estonia,
Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kyrgyzstan Republic, Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Ukraine, and Viet Nam.
55. Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Laos Peoples
Democratic Republic, Montenegro, Serbia, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
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weaknesses of the market economy, particularly in relation to
financial reforms and regulatory issues. For the purpose of this
study the key question is, how did the 2008–09 crisis affect the
orientation of developing countries to trade liberalization and
associated issues in domestic reform? The answers to this
question have revolved around which countries that coped
better with the crisis, the WTO-consistency of measures taken
by individual Members to contain and mitigate the effects of
the crisis, and the common position by Members of the value of
the WTO, as a multilateral institution, in the midst of the
global economic crisis.
The economic performance of developing countries, their
reaction, and their role in the aftermath of the 2008 and 2009
global financial and economic crisis is the subject of continuing
analysis. The results of analysis, thus far, indicate that
developed countries were severely affected by the financial
crisis, while developing countries coped better, and are most
likely to become the “pulling force” and the “new engine for
global growth” with scope to “partially rescue advanced
economies.”56 It is forecast that the superior performance of
developing countries will be sustained, with the projection that,
collectively the size of developing countries GDP’s will exceed
that of developed countries by 2015.57 Some of the factors to
which this forecast for enhanced and superior economic
performance are attributed include technological convergence,
better policies, higher commodity prices, and trade
integration.58 Details of the analysis indicate that developing
countries’ improved growth performance is not simply a bias,
reflecting robust performance by China and India. In fact,
median growth was substantially higher in developing
countries (2.13%) than in advanced economies (-3.72%) in
2009.59 Policies in favor of reform and trade liberalization have
paid off.
56. Otaviano Canuto, Toward a Switchover of Locomotives in the Global
Economy, 33 ECON. PREMISE 1, 4 (2010), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IN
TPREMNET/Resources/EP33.pdf.
57. Id.
58. See generally Otaviano Canuto & Marcelo Gigugale, THE DAY AFTER
TOMORROW: A HANDBOOK ON THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE
DEVELOPING WORLD 1, 1–27(Otaviano Canuto & Marcelo Gigugale eds., 2010).
59. Otaviano Canuto, Recoupling or Switchover? Developing Countries in
the Global Economy, in Canuto & Gigugale, supra note 58, at 31, 33–34.

OSAKWE - Final Version

390

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

4/22/2011 6:21 PM

[Vol 20:2

The WTO has not ruled or taken a position on the question
of the consistency of trade-related measures by its Members
associated with the global economic and financial crisis. And it
will not do so because questions about the WTO-consistency or
inconsistency of trade measures by its Members are potentially
sub judice in an institution with enforceable rules, pursuant to
the DSU. However, within the framework of the Trade Policy
Review Mechanism (TPRM), in October 2008, WTO DirectorGeneral Pascal Lamy initiated Monitoring Reports for WTO
Members on the global financial and economic crisis. These
reports have focused on trade and trade-related developments
associated with the financial and economic crisis.60 At the April
2, 2009 Summit in London, G20 leaders requested “Reports on
G20 Trade and Investment Measures.” Three such reports have
been submitted so far to the G20.61 These reports to the G20
have been jointly prepared by the WTO Director-General,
OECD Secretary-General and Secretary-General of UNCTAD.
These reports monitor and publicly report on G20 adherence to
their undertakings to resist protectionism and promote global
trade and investment. The overall purpose of these two classes
of reports was to ensure that markets remained open for global
recovery. Their central lessons were uniform, of which the
fundamental lesson, inter alia,62 was that, the Multilateral
60. Trade Policy Review Body, Annual Report by the Director General:
Overview of Developments in the International Trading Environment,
WT/TPR/OV/13 (Nov. 24, 2010); Trade Policy Review Body, Report to the
TPRB from the Director-General on Trade-Related Developments,
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 (June 14, 2010); Trade Policy Review Body, Annual Report
by the Director General: Overview of Developments in the International
Trading Environment, WT/TPR/OV/12 (Nov. 18, 2009). Note: The background
to these monitoring reports was the work of the internal Secretariat Task
Force established by the Director-General in October 2008, to advise him on
the trade implications of the financial crisis. Several Members, thereafter,
requested that the results of the work of the task force be shared with all
Members and that there should be a discussion among Members on the trade
impact of the global financial crisis. These reports have since been sustained.
61. Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev. [OECD], United Nations Conf. on
Trade and Dev. [UNCTAD] & World Trade Org. [WTO], REPORT ON G20
TRADE AND INVESTMENT MEASURES: SEPTEMBER 2009 TO FEBRUARY 2010
(Mar. 8, 2010); OECD, UNCTAD & WTO, REPORT ON G20 TRADE AND
INVESTMENT MEASURES: MID-MAY TO MID-OCTOBER 2010 (Nov. 4, 2010);
OECD, UNCTAD & WTO, REPORT ON G20 TRADE AND INVESTMENT
MEASURES (Sept. 14, 2009).
62. Other key lessons drawn were: i) ensuring continued access and
affordability of trade finance to ensure that international trade continued to
play its shock-absorbing role; and ii) knowledge of the fact that the global
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Trading System, by keeping markets open during periods of
financial and economic crisis, had demonstrated that it
provided crisis-affected countries with a chance to recover
through trade. Trade restrictions contract the volume of trade
and, by consequence, create welfare losses, decelerate growth,
and generate pressures for rising unemployment. High levels of
unemployment create temptations for protectionism. One of the
many lessons from economic history was that protectionist
measures have tended to provoke counter measures from
trading partners with the risk of tit-for-tat protectionism or
beggar-thy-neighbor policies. The 2008–09 crisis had induced
the collapse of trade. Global trade volumes fell about 18% in
the last two quarters of 2008 and early 2009. Although there
was “low intensity” protection, including through measures
taken to contain and mitigate the effects of the crisis,
fortunately, the huge protectionist backlash that was feared did
not materialize. Prevention of full-blown protectionist
measures had been kept in check through the monitoring
mechanism established by WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy
in 2009.63 The rules of the WTO had provided a buffer against
protectionist backlash and contributed to recovery and growth
by ensuring that markets remained open. There was a clear
recognition from the global financial and economic crisis
between 2008 and 2009 about the high value of the WTO as a
global Public Good and the role it had played in the period of
crisis and recession.
IV. MULTILATERAL RULES-BASED REFORM PRESSURES
Always at risk of either inertia, rollback, or protectionist
encroachment, the Multilateral Trading System has relied on
successive rounds of trade negotiations to initiate new trade
liberalization, inject momentum to sustain trade liberalization,
and keep protectionism at bay. In making the case for the
launch of the Doha Round, the bicycle theory for sustaining
trade liberalization and countering protectionism was recalled
by Robert Zoellick, the United States Trade Representative:
economy cannot grow above the limits of its real production; growth based on
excessive liquidity and debt would eventually create painful corrections.
63. See generally Pascal Lamy, Director-General, World Trade Org., The
Values of the Multilateral Trading System, Address Before the Lowy Institute
(discussing in part the necessity of the WTO’s trade policy review mechanism
in warding off protectionism).
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“[a]fter all, there is a bicycle theory for trade: [i]f the trade
liberalization process does not move forward, it will, like a
bicycle, be pulled down by the political gravity of special
interests.”64 Successive trade rounds combined with recourse to
the DSU, Trade Policy Reviews, and the regular functioning of
the rules-based system, have generated constant multilateral
energy for liberalization, in particular in developing countries,
and for compliance with extant rules. Trade rounds have
reinforced the policy-relevance and the intellectual case for
trade liberalization. Developing countries in particular have
been heavily influenced by systemic multilateral pressures for
reform, which have combined with domestic priorities for
reform.
There have been eight rounds of trade negotiations. The
Doha Round in progress is the ninth round. The Uruguay
Round was launched in 1986. It was an important factor in
sustaining the 1980s reform agenda and sustaining the
momentum for trade liberalization in the 1990s. The Uruguay
Round preparatory work contributed to framing the agenda of
trade opening in the 1990s. It was initiated and negotiated, in
part, in response to the external shocks, crisis and recession of
the 1980s.65 The negotiating engagements in the eight-year
Uruguay Round assisted developing (and other countries) to
respond to the crisis environment of the decade by designing
and locking-in domestic reforms, including through
commitments for the reduction of barriers to trade. Several of
the results of the Uruguay Round, contributed to sustaining the
momentum for trade liberalization amongst WTO Members,
particularly developing countries. These were:
 the agreement to establish a fair and market-oriented
agricultural trading system through a reform process
in agriculture, pursuant to the Agreement on
64. Robert B. Zoellick, Five US Reasons for Liberalizing Trade, INT’L
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Nov. 7, 2001), http://www.iccwbo.org/iccbiie/index.ht
ml. One of the most eloquently argued cases to support the 2001 launch of the
Doha Round was by Ambassador Robert Zoellick. Note that Fred Bergsten and
Jagdish Bhagwati, two champions of free trade, have been associated with and
variously advocated the so called bicycle theory of trade. Sustained
liberalization is vital, otherwise the risk of reversals, rollback and
protectionist recidivism are ever-present. In trade, the status quo is not a
constant. It is always at risk of slippage. The status quo is not a feature of
trade policy.
65. See supra Part II.
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Agriculture. For the first time, agriculture, a heavily
distorted area of international trade, was brought
within the framework and disciplines of the rules-based
Multilateral Trading System;
 elimination of the Multifiber Agreement;
 the General Agreement on Trade in Services;
 establishment of the Trade Policy Review; and
 an enforceable set of rules in accordance with the
DSU.66
Empirical data and economic theory show the definite
association between freer trade and economic growth. This,
however, does not imply causal linkages. There are gains from
trade. Countries benefit when they trade in goods and services,
produced from their human, industrial, natural, and financial
assets, on the basis of their comparative advantage. The free
flow of goods and services enhance competition, provide for
innovation and open up the inflow of capital, technology and
ideas. In static approaches, the effect of trade opening is the
increase in real GDP at world prices, through efficiency in
resource allocation, specialization, based on comparative
advantage, market-based exit and entry of firms and enjoyment
of scale economies. There are also dynamic gains.67 The
evidence indicates that in the first twenty-five years after
World War II, world trade grew at an average of 8% faster than
world economic growth, averaging about 5%.68 The successive
cycles of trade negotiations have contributed significantly to
global welfare since 1947.
The Doha Round is the ninth round of trade negotiations
within the rules-based Multilateral Trading System. It was
launched in Qatar in 2001. December 2010 marks the tenth
year at which negotiators have been engaged to seek the
conclusion of the Doha Round.

66. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
67. WORLD TRADE ORG., WORLD TRADE REPORT 2008: TRADE IN A
GLOBALIZING
WORLD,
27–75
(2008),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report08_e.pd
f.
68. World Trade Org., Understanding the WTO: The Basics, The Case for
Open Trade, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact3_e.htm.
(last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
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PERIOD
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MEMBERS

1947
1949

Geneva
Annecy

Tariffs
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23
13

1951

Torquay

Tariffs

38

1956

Geneva

Tariffs

26

1960-1961

Geneva (Dillon
Round)
Geneva
(Kennedy
Round)
Geneva (Tokyo
Round)

Tariffs

26

1964-1967
1973-1979
1986-1994

Uruguay
Round

2001

Doha
Development
Agenda

Tariffs and Anti-Dumping
Tariffs, NTMs, Rules,
Services, Intellectual
Property
Tariffs, NTMs, Rules,
Services, Intellectual
Property, Dispute
Settlement, Textiles,
Agriculture, WTO
establishment
Agriculture, NonAgricultural Market
Access, Services, Trade
Facilitation, Trade and
Environment, TRIPs,
Development, Dispute
Settlement

102
123

153

There are specific objectives agreed by Members for
individual trade rounds. Regardless of the specificity of
individual trade rounds, there is a common purpose. The
overriding strategic rationale of trade rounds is to provide
positive momentum for trade reform and liberalization, contain
protectionism and prevent rollback and, at crisis moments,
contribute to recovery, with a steady propulsion toward global
economic growth. Successive trade rounds have contributed to
sustaining the momentum for trade reform amongst WTO
Members, including developing country Members. Contracting
parties, under the GATT, and Members, under the WTO, have
tailored specific arguments to their domestic constituencies
prior to the launch and conclusion of trade rounds.
Policy-relevant lessons have been drawn from successive
trade rounds for trade liberalization, including from the current
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Doha Round.69 Three are relevant for initiating and sustaining
the momentum for trade liberalization: establishing an
intellectual foundation for reform, demonstrating trade and
development linkages, and understanding the lock-step
relationship between the pace of domestic reform priorities and
multilateral trade opening.70
First, there is greater sensitivity to perceived “gains” and
“losses.” Trade policy issues integral to trade negotiations are
at the center of national policy debates that revolve around
globalization and its governance, the benefits of global
integration, domestic issues of unemployment, poverty
reduction, etc. The intellectual case that was made in the 1980s
was key in generating the momentum for trade liberalization in
developing countries. Prior to this, the policy option of trade
liberalization had been considered overly prescriptive,
originating from multilateral institutions advocating the
Washington Consensus. The intellectual case that was made
contributed to the construction of domestic coalitions for
initiating trade and wider domestic reforms.
Second, the first Geneva Trade Round in 1947 focused
exclusively on tariffs. Twenty-three countries participated, of
which eleven were developing countries. One hundred and
twenty-three countries participated in the Uruguay Round
(1986–1994). Currently, there are 153 WTO Members,
participating in the Doha Round negotiations. A feature of the
increase in the membership is characterized by the fact that
over one hundred were developing country Members. As a
consequence, there has been an increased demand for a
development dimension in the rules-based Multilateral Trading
System and to more clearly establish the trade and
development linkages to ensure that trade serves a
development purpose. The development mandate of the WTO
was set in the Doha Round; hence the Doha Development
Agenda (DDA). An observation from negotiations, past and
present, is that rounds tend to reflect the situation in the global
economy, because the circumstance of the global economy
69. Id.
70. Chiedu, Osakwe, The Future of the Doha Round after Suspension in
Geneva and Deadlock in Potsdam: Is it All in Vain?, in AGREEING AND
IMPLEMENTING THE DOHA ROUND OF THE WTO 16, 36 (Harold Hohman ed.,
2008).
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typically frames the negotiating environment. In the context of
the Doha Round negotiations, the pressures remain for the
DDA negotiations to be sensitive to developments in the
negotiating environment, such as hunger, linked to the 2007–
08 food price crises, the poverty reduction and other goals in
the MDGs, the 2008–09 global financial and economic crisis,
and the constantly recurring use of export restrictions in the
agricultural sector (particularly affecting cotton, grains and
animal products).
Third, there is a linkage between sustained programs for
domestic policy reforms, on the one hand, with multilateral
negotiations for trade liberalization, on the other. Furthermore,
implementation of the results of multilateral trade negotiations
is linked to domestic reforms, buy-in, and ownership. In the ongoing Doha Round, there is keener understanding about the
necessary linkages between domestic reform and trade rounds.
There is a complex relationship between domestic policy
reforms and multilateral trade negotiations (including the
implementation of their results). While the pressures of trade
negotiations and the consequent multilateral obligations can
exercise a positive effect that provide support for countries to
lock-in and sustain domestic reforms, the latter can also
provide impetus for sustaining multilateral trade liberalization.
(The latter applies to both developed and developing country
members).71 This general proposition is as true in trade rounds
as they are in accession negotiations for WTO membership.
There was a wave of developing country membership into
the Multilateral Trading System, from the mid-1980s to 1995.
Between 1986 (launch of the Uruguay Round) and 1995 (the
establishment of the WTO), twenty-seven developing countries
became Members of the rules-based system.72 In addition, eight
more developing countries that were GATT signatories during
the Uruguay Round became Members of the WTO in 1996.73
71. Three examples would be the United States Trade Promotion
Authority and its successive farm bills, the European Union 2009 CAP
Reform, and the Sectoral Initiative on Cotton from the four African countries
of Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali.
72. Bahrain, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Costa Rica, Djibouti,
Dominica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hong
Kong (China), Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Macao (China), Mali, Mexico, Morocco,
Mozambique, Namibia, Paraguay, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Swaziland, Tunisia, and Venezuela.
73. Angola, Fiji, Grenada, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Saint Kitts and
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The larger proportion of developing country Members gave
impetus to the strong advocacy for a development dimension to
the rules-based system. This advocacy of a development
dimension to the trading system was combined with a new
push by developing countries for the liberalization of the most
heavily distorted areas of global trade, particularly agriculture.
Developing countries also strongly pushed for liberalization of
trade policy instruments that had been in restrictive
application against their trade and exports. These were
primarily tariff peaks and escalation, rules of origin and nontariff barriers.
The changing trade policy behavior of developing countries
towards liberalization was also evident in the dramatic shifts
from the Second WTO Ministerial Conference in 1998 in
Geneva, to the Third Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999,
and the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in 2001 in Qatar.
In the preparatory work and consultations leading up to the
Second WTO Ministerial Conference in Geneva, the vast
majority of developing countries staunchly opposed the launch
of a new trade round. They pushed for the “implementation” of
agreed results from the prior trade round. The result from the
Geneva Ministerial was the so called “Implementation
Outcome.” At the 1998 Second Ministerial Conference,
Ministers decided that:
[A] process will be established under the direction of the General
Council to ensure full and faithful implementation of existing
agreements, and to prepare for the Third Session of the Ministerial
Conference. This process shall enable the General Council to submit
recommendations regarding the WTO’s work programme, including
further liberalization sufficiently broad-based to respond to the range
of interests and concerns of all Members, within the WTO
framework, that will enable us to take decisions at the Third Session
of the Ministerial Conference.74

The push to launch a new trade round was deferred to the
Third WTO Ministerial Conference, the following year in
Seattle, where there was failure again to launch the next trade
round, in the face of developing country (largely African)
ambivalence and strong opposition. The new round was
eventually launched at the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference
Nevis, Solomon Islands, and the United Arab Emirates.
74. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 20 May 1998,
para. 9, WT/MIN(98)/DEC/1 (1998).
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in 2001 in Doha, Qatar. Decision-making to launch the round
had become virtually certain with WTO Members united
against the tragic episode of the terror attacks of 9/11 and
convinced that the launch of a new trade round would provide
greater certainty in the face of global insecurity and calm
markets. Therefore, from initial ambivalence and opposition in
1998 and 1999, the vast majority of developing countries
reversed their opposition to further liberalization, through
trade rounds, and became strong advocates for the launch of
the Doha Round. Since the launch of the Doha Round,
developing countries are the engines driving efforts to conclude
the round. They have also emerged as strong challengers
against what they consider as developed country protectionism,
through the invocation of the DSU.
The architecture of the WTO as a multilateral institution
has served to secure rule-compliant, trade reformist behavior
and systemic pressure to check and counter protectionism. This
architecture rests on the pillars of enforceable rules under the
DSU, periodic Trade Policy Reports and monitoring reports
within the framework of the TPRM, and the accumulating
effects of the terms of accession of RAMs, pursuant to GATT
Article XII accession negotiations. This architecture, renovated
by periodic trade rounds, has acted in combination with
domestic growth priorities in developing countries to generate
and sustain the momentum for trade liberalization.
The DSU is the foundation of the rules-based Multilateral
Trading System. It ensures that trading rules are enforced,
that WTO Members operate on the basis of the rule of law and
that the trading system is secure and predictable. Recourse to
and frequency of invocation of the DSU suggests deeper
institutional engagement in the rules-based system. Greater
recourse to dispute settlement is associated with trade opening
behavior and commitment to domestic reforms. The data
suggests that in the fifteen-year period between 1995 and 2010,
developing countries, taken together, have increased recourse
to dispute settlement as “complainants.” As a group, they are
now fairly active users of the system. Increased recourse to
dispute settlement would suggest greater sensitivity to the
content of trade measures and the effects they carry for
consistency or inconsistency with the rules of the trading
system.
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Figure IV shows that, after 1995 (the year of WTO
establishment), developed countries were more likely to invoke
dispute settlement as complainants in the following four years.
In more recent years, recourse to dispute settlement as
complainants, has been more or less comparable between
developed and developing countries.
Figure IV: Participation in Dispute Settlement75 as
Complainants
1995 1996 1997
50% 62% 80%
50% 38% 20%

1998 1999 2000
88% 70% 45%
12% 30% 55%

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
29% 52% 38% 63% 42%
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As indicated in Figure V below, as respondents, developing
countries have been defendants in about fifty percent less of the
cases, compared to developed countries in the fifteen-year
period between 1995 and 2010. A range of plausible reasons
exist to explain this pattern. Regardless, what is more
important is the fact that developing countries have been
respondents in cases regarding the WTO-consistency of
measures taken. This increases awareness and sharpens
sensitivity that trade measures that developing countries take
(as with other Members) should aspire to be WTO-consistent.

75. Percentages are based on “requests for consultations.”
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Figure V: Participation in Dispute Settlement76 as Respondents
1995 1996 1997
76% 49% 58%
24% 51% 42%
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75% 57% 41%
25% 43% 59%
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The TPRM, although not designed to enforce specific
obligations under the covered agreements or to be used in
dispute settlement procedures, contributes to improved
adherence to the rules and disciplines. The TPRM achieves this
objective through greater transparency of the trade policies and
practices of Members. Additionally, the TPRM functions to
examine the impact of the trade policies and practices of a
Member on the Multilateral Trading System. In doing so,
account is taken, to the extent relevant, of the wider economic
and development needs, policies and objectives and the
external environment of the Member under review. In the
periodicity of reviews, developed Members are reviewed every
two years, developing members every four years and leastdeveloped Members at, more or less, six yearly intervals. There
have been 112 Trade Policy Reviews at the WTO since 1995,77
of which, 102 for developing countries or separate customs
territories had their trade policy reviews, at least once.
Amongst the fifteen WTO Members78 that have not been
76. Percentages are based on “requests for consultations.”
77. The Trade Policy Reviews of customs territories (SACU, EU and the
OECS) are counted as one review each.
78. Cambodia, Cape Verde, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Guinea Bissau, Kuwait,
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reviewed, fourteen are developing countries,79 of which eight
are RAMs80 (with higher levels of WTO rule compliance in light
of their terms of accession). Most Members have been reviewed
more than once.81 The monitoring reports of the crisis effects on
the trading system have taken place within the framework of
the TPRM.
Three recent examples stand-out of trade liberalization
policy behavior by developing countries, engendered by the
unique trade liberalizing WTO architecture. These are: i) the
Sectoral Initiative on Cotton; ii) the Indian proposal on
“Strengthening the WTO;”82 and iii) support for the monitoring
process initiated by the Director-General, in October 2008, to
report on developments associated with the financial and
economic crisis and to ensure that such monitoring reports
contribute to keeping markets open.
Although trade policy behavior has not always been
uniform and consistent, the system, as constructed, has
exercised a strong and positively dynamic effect on the trade
liberalizing behavior of developing countries as a whole. The
rules-based Multilateral Trading System has been a key factor
driving the trade liberalization in developing countries. This
fact was also highlighted in Hudec’s analysis that developing
countries could and should use multilateral trade rules to
initiate and lock-in domestic reforms.
V. WTO ARTICLE XII ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS
REFORM PRESSURES
Although there has been a range of critical observations
about the WTO accession process and questions on the
substance of some of the results produced, the facts show that
WTO accessions have contributed in driving the liberalization
Moldova, Myanmar, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Tonga, Viet Nam, and Zimbabwe
79. FYROM is an EU candidate country.
80. Cambodia, Cape Verde, FYROM, Moldova, Nepal, Saudi Arabia,
Tonga, and Viet Nam.
81. For a full and illuminating treatment of the coverage of Trade Policy
Reviews and in particular the participation of African countries see, Laker
Joan Apecu, African Participation at the World Trade Organizations—Legal
and Institutional Aspects, 1995–2010, (forthcoming, unpublished PhD Thesis
in International Studies—International Law, on file with Graduate Institute
of International and Development Studies, Geneva).
82. General Council, Strengthening the WTO; Communication from India,
WT/GC/W/605 (July 3, 2009).
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momentum of a group of recently acceded developing countries.
The WTO accession-engendered reforms also explain, in large
measure, the positive trade performance of the group of
Members referred to as RAMs, of which most are developing
Members (countries and separate customs territories). It is also
true that the results of WTO accessions have affected the
functioning of the WTO. For instance, this is the case with
regard to the trade policy behavior of the RAMS in the Doha
Round negotiations.
The legal and policy framework for WTO accession
negotiations is established in Article XII of the 1995 Marrakesh
Agreement.83 Fundamentally, accession is on “terms to be
agreed” with Members.84 This is open-ended, although in
practice these terms have emerged to accord with WTO rules,
tighten, update and modernize GATT/WTO rules. In addition,
with regard to the LDCs, there is an additional framework for
more lenient treatment. In the Doha Declaration, Ministers
stated that: “Accession of LDCs remains a priority for the
Membership. We agree to work to facilitate and accelerate
negotiations with acceding LDCs.”85 As follow-up, in December
2002, the WTO General Council adopted the Decision on
Accession
of
Least-Developed
Countries
(Accession
Guidelines).86 The Accession Guidelines did not modify the
rules for WTO accessions. However, it established a framework
for the lenient treatment of LDCs’ accessions on the
parameters of reasonableness of request and offer in bilateral
market access negotiations, good offices intervention by the
Director-General and working party chairpersons to resolve
difficulties, the option of choice for LDCs to accept
commitments in plurilateral agreements, and enhanced
technical assistance for acceding LDCs.87
83. Accession under the GATT was pursuant to GATT Article XXVI:5(c),
through “sponsorship by Declaration of the responsible Contracting Party,”
which largely applied to former colonies. GATT art. XXVI:5(c). Accession was
also pursuant to GATT Article XXXIII, comparable to the WTO accession legal
framework provided for in Article XII of the 1995 Marrakesh Agreement.
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
84. Marrakesh Agreement art. XII.
85. Doha Declaration para. 42.
86. General Council, Accession of Least-Developed Countries, WT/L/508
(Dec. 10, 2002).
87. See id.
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The accession process has produced concrete and positive
results for the WTO and the acceding governments.
Membership has expanded. Since the establishment of the
WTO in 1995, twenty-five governments88 have acceded to the
WTO, within the legal and policy framework of Article XII of
the Marrakesh Agreement,89 and the LDCs’ Accession
Guidelines. Twenty-one of these governments are developing
countries, of which three (Cambodia, Cape Verde90 and Nepal)
are LDCs. The results of accession negotiations and the
consequent terms of entry for the twenty-five RAMs have
strengthened systemic rules, reinforced the institution, and
provided substantial welfare gains for the RAMs and the global
economy through market access enhancement. Using the
accession process as an instrument of domestic reform,
individual RAMs have accelerated trade growth and advanced
their broader domestic modernization agenda. The particular
experience of the RAMs has also had its effect on the agenda of
the WTO. This is reflected in the trade policy behavior of RAMs
in the Doha Round negotiations.
The process per se, pursuant to Article XII of the
Marrakesh Agreement, is long, demanding, and complex, in
contrast to the accession process under the GATT, pursuant to
GATT Articles XXVI:5(c) and XXXIII. Negotiations evolve along
two tracks, bilateral and multilateral, reflect long-standing
custom, and have varied in length. However, if count is taken
from the baseline of the establishment of the working parties,
accession negotiations have lasted, on average, eight years and
six months. This average time is shorter, if the length of the
negotiations is measured from the time when the acceding
government submits its Memorandum of the Foreign Trade
Regime (MFTR). In this latter category, accession negotiations
88. Bulgaria and Ecuador (1996); Mongolia and Panama (1997);
Kyrgyzstan (1998); Estonia and Latvia (1999); Albania, Croatia, Georgia,
Jordan and Oman (2000); China, Lithuania and Moldova (2001); Chinese
Taipei (2002); Armenia, FYROM (2003); Cambodia and Nepal (2004); Saudi
Arabia (2005); Tonga and Viet Nam (2007); and Cape Verde and Ukraine
(2008).
89. It is to be noted, however, that in 1996, five countries acceded under a
one-off special procedure by the General Council pursuant to Article XII of the
Marrakesh Agreement. General Council, Finalization of Negotiations on
Schedules on Goods and Services, WT/L/30 (Jan. 31, 1995).
90. Cape Verde has graduated from the LDC category and is now
classified as a developing country.
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have lasted, on average, six years and four months. Questions
put to acceding governments are far-reaching, detailed and
substantive. This is purposeful. It enables the acceding
government to undertake a self-x-ray. Most acceding
governments have admitted that the question and answer
process, on the multilateral track of the negotiations, enabled
them, for the first time, to take stock and re-organize domestic
arrangements for the effective coordination and management of
economic and trade policy and, the institutions for formulating
and decision-making in economic and trade policy. The process
of questioning is substantive, iterative and frequentative.
The Article XII accession process is unique in international
treaty development. On the basis of the MFTR, submitted by
the acceding government, Members initiate a treatyformulating dialogue with the acceding government. This
dialogue is spurred on by a non-stop cycle of questioning that
obliges the acceding government to be fully transparent in the
disclosure of non-confidential trade details. This dialogue,
reflected in periodic updates of the draft working party reports,
leads the acceding government to accept commitments to
eliminate trade restrictions and secure flexibilities, such as
transition periods based on an action plan, to phase-out WTOinconsistent laws, procedures, and practices. The dialogue leads
to the acceptance of negotiated commitment language that
forms part of the terms of accession of the acceding
government. These are codified in a draft working party report.
The dialogue process, driven by the non-stop cycle of the “Q &
R” process, reflected in updates of the draft working party
report, is unique in international treaty-making. In several
areas, these commitments have exceeded those undertaken by
the 1995 founding WTO Members. This has had raised
questions about the WTO-plus substance of the terms of
membership accepted by the RAMs. The substantive terms of
membership have entailed far-reaching and sometimes painful
domestic reform decisions for acceding governments.
On the bilateral track, individual Members exercise the
right of Members to request bilateral market access
negotiations with the acceding government. These bilateral
negotiations are confidential and evolve on the basis of a
request by a Member and an offer by the acceding government.
The rationale for confidentiality and the request/offer approach
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is that through negotiating pressure on the one hand, and the
carrot of WTO membership, on the other, the acceding
government accepts far-reaching tariff concessions and specific
commitments in services, which provide win-win welfare gains
for the acceding government and the membership. Concluded
individual bilateral negotiations are then deposited with the
WTO Director-General who consolidates (anonymizes) the
results of the individual bilateral negotiations. The results
apply on an MFN basis to all WTO Members. The accession
protocol, the draft working party report and, the draft
consolidated goods and services schedule form part of the final
package for the acceding government.
The accession process and the results have been subjected
to a range of critical commentary and analysis. The issues are
worth reviewing. Some consider that there are tensions in the
accession process, arising from the mercantilist heritage of the
GATT versus the role of the WTO, as an institutional vessel for
a global public good, and that these tensions are evident in the
experience of its accession procedures.91 The purpose of this
argument has been to raise issues associated with the cost of
accession and that membership is not free.
There have been criticisms of the lack of transparency in
the confidential bilateral market access negotiations, which, it
is argued, has been a cover for extracting non-trade
concessions. In this vein, some have examined the issues by
relating what they term as known facts to what they consider
to be folklore and perceptions because of confidentiality aspects
of the negotiations.
A raft of observations and initial discussions have revolved
around increasing costs, protracted duration, negotiating
complexity, uncertain and deferred rewards, WTO-plus
commitments, developmental impact of accession negotiations,
and the risk of a multi-tiered trading system. In some specific
observations, for instance, although it is acknowledged that the
WTO accession process could play a useful role in the political
economy of trade reform, there is systemic concern that the
growing price of WTO accession will create a multi-tiered
trading system. Concerns are raised that the process is
91. Olivier Cattaneo & Carlos Primo Braga, Everything You Always
Wanted to Know About WTO Accession (But Were Afraid to Ask), (World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper No. 5116, 2009).
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unusually long and complex, with uncertainty of the price of
WTO accession. The suggestion is made that developmental
needs and sustaining support should drive the design and
implementation of the accession process and associated
technical assistance.92
Related to the concern about the emergence of a multitiered trading system, some have suggested that WTO-plus
commitments by RAMs carry a risk for the principle of nondiscrimination. The argument is that a two-tier membership (a
second class of WTO membership) is emerging because of
different terms agreed with RAMs. In this argument, although
there are positive effects of WTO-plus obligations, these may
carry grave implications for the WTO legal system because,
singling out a Member for differential treatment is inconsistent
with the fundamental WTO principle of non-discrimination.93
In sum, the basic criticisms have revolved around the
issues of mercantilist pressures, complexity, length,
transparency, accession benefits, development impact, risks for
the principle of non-discrimination arising from WTO-plus (or
minus commitments), and risks for the emergence of a multitiered trading system. There are degrees of plausibility to
several in the arguments.
Traces of mercantilism persist in the Multilateral Trading
System. There are no easy or simple ways of eliminating this
pernicious practice, except to continue to address it almost
educationally through successive rounds of trade negotiations.
Trade policy is subject to politics, and mercantilism is one of
the several points of intersection of trade policy, economics, and
politics. In spite of best efforts to eliminate this practice, traces
of mercantilism are likely to permanently linger. However,
rather than being the problem, it is argued that the accession
process is actually one of the vehicles for addressing the
mercantilist problem. The accession process, in a rules-based
multilateral trading system, is an instrument for resisting
mercantilist pressures.
92. Simon J. Evenett & Carlos A. Primo Braga, WTO Accession: Moving
the Goalposts?, in TRADE, DOHA, AND DEVELOPMENT: A WINDOW INTO THE
ISSUES 235–36 (Richard Newfarmer ed., 2006).
93. Julia Ya Qin, “WTO-Plus” Obligations and Their Implications for the
World Trade Organization Legal System: An Appraisal of the China Accession
Protocol, 37(3) J. WORLD TRADE 483, 512–13 (2003).
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Complexity is in the very nature of the accession process.
As WTO rules increase and with interpretation, emerging from
jurisprudence pursuant to the DSU, the complexity will be
magnified. Complexity is also inherent in a rules-based
multilateral system, where the rules are enforceable and
require concomitant municipal WTO-consistent legislation. The
complexity is deepened because accession commitments are
inter-locked with domestic reforms and enactment of
legislation. This is in the nature of the WTO, but is a strength,
not a weakness.
Transparency questions have revolved around the
confidentiality practice in the bilateral market access
negotiations compared to the multilateral negotiations which
are open to all working party Members. These concerns have
been exacerbated in cases where there have been apparent
blockages and perceptions of blockage, in instances where other
Members have themselves queried requests that are highly
questionable in form and substance, and which could only have
been made under cover of confidentiality. While there has been
some abuse, the background to the practice of confidentiality is
useful. It was established as a rational method to assist
acceding governments to eliminate harmful and egregious
barriers to trade, in bilateral negotiations, without public
embarrassing climb-downs for the acceding government. To a
large extent, this remains the case. However, questions have
arisen in respect of apparent blockages, in a limited number of
instances, where confidential negotiations have been used to
leverage concessions extraneous to the accession in question.
Fortunately, WTO Members (particularly those active in the
accession process) are aware of the concerns, and the prevailing
perceptions and misperceptions. They have responded to the
demands for greater transparency. In some accession processes
underway, Members have requested that their questions to an
acceding government, stemming from confidentially negotiated
bilateral agreements, be circulated to other Members for the
process of the multilateral review of consolidated draft
schedules.
Other measures have been taken to enhance transparency.
The WTO Secretariat is reporting more elaborately and
consistently on the state of play in bilateral market access
negotiations, although the negotiating core remains
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confidential to the parties. In 2009, the Director-General’s
annual report on accession was introduced. The Informal Group
on Accessions, a Members’ forum for managing the accession
process and the working parties, was expanded to accommodate
broader representation and inclusiveness of the Membership
spectrum. A Secretariat newsletter service was initiated with
acceding governments. This service not only provides relevant
information for the acceding government, but also invites them
to offer suggestions, such as when they would like to convene
their working parties, based on their self-assessment of their
state of preparedness, pace of domestic reforms, enactment of
legislation and progress in their accessions.
It has been argued that the principle of non-discrimination
is at risk, with the emergence of a multi-tiered trading system
(a second class WTO membership) with WTO-plus
commitments. As argued, this risk is increased, in instances,
where a Member is singled out in country-specific rule-making
for differential treatment inconsistent with the nondiscrimination principle.94 This argument and its implications
need to be carefully considered. At first blush, it is tempting to
view this argument as the flip-side of the same coin of Hudec’s
argument that exemptions from the rules, in the form of the
1940s “special and differential approach” (GATT-minus
commitments), compromised the MFN (non-discrimination)
principle. In the more recent, almost mirror argument, WTOplus commitments, in particular those targeted at countryspecific rule-making, put at risk the non-discrimination
principle.95 The question is whether WTO-plus or WTO-minus
commitments compromise or put at risk the principle of nondiscrimination. The arguments will not be resolved here, but
perhaps some points could be identified as to how this question,
in particular the WTO-plus commitments, could be examined.
First, WTO-plus (higher level) commitments exercise
different effects from WTO-minus (lower level) commitments.
The former, on balance, have been decidedly positive to
complement, tighten loopholes, and modernize existing GATT
rules, in areas that lacked clarity. One of several such areas is
that of quantitative restrictions. While there have been
dissatisfaction and criticism by some, WTO-plus commitments
94. See id.
95. Id.
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have strengthened the rules-based system. Exemptions from
the rules, at lower levels, are in a different category. Second,
the principle of non-discrimination is the foundation of the
rules-based Multilateral Trading System. GATT rules,
however, provide for departures from non-discrimination, in
both the areas of goods and services, but only when Members
agree to do so, either with regard to rules that apply to other
Members or with regard to the terms of accession of acceding
governments. Regarding the rules that apply to Members, the
most obvious departures, pursuant to GATT rules are Article I
exceptions, the 1979 Enabling Clause, Article III exceptions,
Article XIII, Article XIV, the conditional exceptions in Article
XX and XXI and Article XXIV. In the GATS, these cover
essentially Article II.2 and Article XIV. In addition, the
Marrakesh Agreement Article IX:3 provides for waivers. While
the risks to and departures from non-discrimination have been
ever-constant, the system has been and remains strong enough
to fend off these risks. Third, under the DSU, WTO
jurisprudence demonstrates that non-discrimination has been
consistently upheld with rulings against discrimination.
WTO-plus terms have to be carefully examined to
determine their effects on the rules. It does not necessarily
follow that WTO-plus will ex ante create different classes of
WTO Membership, or compromise the non-discrimination
principle, even in instances where the argument is presented,
or alleged that such rule(s) have been designed for, or against a
Member. Evidence in the system and in the on-going Doha
negotiations indicates several instances, where specific rules
and draft rules have been designed around a Member. The
question would be whether such rules strengthen the system or
weaken it. The negotiations amongst Members indicate that
the reason for terms or provisions drafted around a Member in
multilateral negotiations, or acceding government in accession
negotiations, is to take account of realities, circumstances and
changing circumstances that are fundamental in trade
integration and for ensuring the balance in trade relations
amongst members. Systemic rules (“the whole”) have always
taken account of the “sum of its parts.” This is not new and has
contributed to the stability of the system.
Fourth, the facts clearly indicate that there are variations
to the terms of accessions. These variations reflect a range of
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factors. They include development status, sensitivity to issues
regarding market economy status and related issues in the
political economy, and the necessity to tailor accession entry
terms on a case-by-case basis. While the non-discrimination
principle and provisions are constant, accession terms are caseby-case. These are not contradictory. What matters is that in
the final analysis, the dispute settlement system remains the
final arbiter with regard to questions about whether the
principle of non-discrimination has been violated with specific
regard to any measures or policies of a Member that impairs or
nullifies the benefits of another Member. Further, WTO rules
apply to Members; they do not apply to non-Members. What
also matters is that in the first fifteen years of the WTO
accession process, the results indicate that the rules have been
reinforced, market access has been expanded, and RAMs,
individually and collectively, have acknowledged that they used
the accession process for their domestic reform and trade
opening. Overall, WTO-plus commitments have tended to
strengthen the rules and engender trade liberalization and
reform.
Taking account of the range of critical commentary, the
relevant questions are: i) in what areas and in what ways has
the accession process engendered sustained the trade
liberalization momentum in developing countries; and ii) what
effects did these reforms have had on the trade performance of
developing country RAMs? There are several key areas where
the commitments accepted by RAMs, including developing
RAMs, had a salutary effect in driving their domestic reforms
and trade liberalization. Essentially, these areas that drove the
reforms and yet provided accommodation for development
status needs broadly cover:
 tariff bindings and services commitments;
 trading rights;
 export regulations: application of internal taxes/duties
to exports;
 export regulations: application of export restrictions;
 customs valuation;
 state-trading enterprises;
 state ownership and privatization;
 notifications/transparency;

OSAKWE - Final Version

4/22/2011 6:21 PM

2011]DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE GATT/WTO RULES 411


dual pricing: non-discrimination, including national
treatment;
 transit;
 agricultural policies;
 trade-related intellectual property rights;
 the anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard
regimes (price comparability and market economy
status);
 the regimes for standards: Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Standards and Technical Barriers to Trade; and
 development status.
Selected areas of commitments on rules by RAMs,
particularly developing country RAMs, in accession
negotiations, are discussed with illustrations. The sum of the
evidence from commitments to the rules plus, engendered
domestic reforms and trading opening in these countries and
supported a virtuous cycle of sustained reforms with welfare
gains.
In consolidated goods schedules of tariff concessions and
commitments, RAMs have a 100% binding on tariff lines for
both agriculture and NAMA. In services, on the average, RAMs
have undertaken specific commitments in more than one
hundred services sub-sectors. These are in contrast to the
average level of commitments for founding WTO Members,
which, in many instances, have been significantly less. The
table below is illustrative of the number of services sub-sectors,
where ten RAMS have taken commitments in relation to ten
original WTO Members with significant interest in services
trade (this is not a comparison).
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SERVICES: NUMBER OF SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS IN SERVICES
SUB-SECTORS
RAMs

Number of
Spec/Commitments

Original
Members

Number of
Spec/Commitments

China
Viet Nam
Saudi
Arabia
Oman
Moldova
Kyrgyz
Jordan
Cambodia
(LDC)
Nepal (LDC)
Cape Verde
(LDC)

93
105
120

EU
US
Hong Kong,
China
Singapore
Brazil
Egypt
India
Nigeria

115
110
68

South Africa
Tanzania
(LDC)

91
1

98
147
138
110
94
77
93

67
43
44
37
32

Through the number and quality of their services
commitments, RAMs have signaled areas of domestic reforms,
existence of prudential regulations, and openness for domestic
and foreign investments. Telecommunications and financial
services are two good examples.
Trading rights is an area where the non-discrimination
principle and its MFN and national treatment rules have been
improved and tightened. Trading rights have uniquely emerged
from accession negotiations and acquis. Classically, GATT rules
were formulated with regard to products and less so to traders
(individuals and enterprises). However, governments in
regulating trade, adopt regulations and laws, which require
traders to register their businesses for importing and
exporting. In practice, conditions for business registration for
trade in goods, could and do discriminate between goods
imported from one country, or countries, or from domestically
produced goods. Limitations to trading rights can take a range
of forms, such as quantity or price-based limitations, prior
approvals (which could be discretionary), and registered scope
of business.
The purpose of the trading rights commitment is to ensure
that all traders in a country or separate customs territory,
including “importers of record,”96 have a right to trade in all
96. An “importer of record" is the right of a trader to import goods into a
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goods, and that conditions for the registration of businesses
neither discriminate nor modify this right to trade, other than
simple and/or automatic registration. In sum, trading rights
are the rights of legal and natural persons of any Member,
exercised by importers of record, to import goods into the
territory of another, as distinguished from the right to sell or
distribute, and without this right modified, or subject to
nationality or residency limitations, or other conditions or
requirements. Trading rights are in accordance with GATT
Articles III: 2 and 4, XI.1 and VIII: 1(a). There were no trading
rights commitments by RAMs in the first four accession
packages.97 However, in the subsequent accession packages,
twenty-one RAMs accepted commitments on trading rights.98
The standard commitment terminology in an accession package
is represented by that of Cape Verde as follows:
The representative of Cape Verde confirmed that from the date of
accession, Cape Verde would grant any natural or legal person,
regardless of physical presence or investment in Cape Verde, the
right to be the importer of record of any product allowed to be
imported into Cape Verde, at any level of distribution, and that its
laws and regulations relating to the right to trade in goods and all
fees, charges or taxes levied on such rights would conform fully with
its WTO obligations, including Articles VIII:1(a), XI:1, and III:2 and
4 of the GATT 1994, Article III of the General Agreement on Trade
in Services, and Article 63 of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. He also confirmed that full
rights to import and to export would be granted in a
non-discriminatory and non-discretionary manner from the date of
accession, and any requirements for commercial registration or
application for trading rights would be for customs and fiscal
purposes only, would not require investment in Cape Verde nor
confer the right to distribute there, and would not constitute a barrier
to trade. The Working Party took note of these commitments.99

Export restrictions, including export duties and taxes,
affect trade. There are questions about the clarity and intent of
country or separate customs territory, without this right being modified by
nationality or residency, and without the right to sell or distribute goods in a
country or separate customs territory.
97. Bulgaria, Ecuador, Mongolia, and Panama.
98. Albania, Armenia, Cambodia, Cape Verde, China, Chinese Taipei,
Croatia, Estonia, FYROM, Georgia, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Kyrgyz
Republic, Moldova, Nepal, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tonga, Ukraine, and Viet
Nam.
99. Working Party on the Accession of Cape Verde, Report of the Working
Party on the Accession of Cape Verde to the World Trade Organization, para.
79, WT/ACC/CPV/30 (Dec. 6, 2007).
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GATT Article XI, on quantitative restrictions, on the extent of
the coverage of export restriction, and why some restrictions
were covered and others not. Many observers have also felt that
this area of the rules required updating and modernization,
adjustment to contemporary realities, and greater clarity.
Article XI of GATT 1947 (and 1994) covered and prohibited
restrictions on imports and exports made effective through
quotas, import or export licenses, with exceptions provided for
in sub-paragraphs (a), (b), and (c)(i), (ii) and (iii). Article XI did
not cover export duties, taxes or other charges. Article 12 of the
1994 Agreement on Agriculture largely provided for
transparency disciplines for measures, pursuant to Article
XI.2(a) of GATT 1994 and further limited the application of the
provision to only developing countries that are net-food
exporters of the specific foodstuff concerned and excluded other
developing countries that are not net-food exporters. It is in
this context of incomplete coverage, lack of full clarity, and
looseness in an area with potentially significant impacts on
trade, that tighter disciplines have been developed in accession
negotiations.
Commitment language was accepted by six RAMs100 on
export duties, taxes, and charges. The commitment language
has ranged from phasing out and elimination of export duties,
with exceptions to reduction of export duties, and nonapplication of any obligatory minimum prices. In the working
party reports, the affected RAMs established “tables” where
export duties apply and, in cases of reduction, agreed to a
schedule for reduction. This area of export duties, taxes, and
charges will be one of active legal and policy interest over the
course of the on-going thirty accession negotiations.
In the area of export restrictions (export and import
licensing) covered by GATT Article XI, eighteen RAMs have
accepted commitment language that has tightened adherence
to the extant rules and closed loopholes. Although there are
variations adapted to the specificities of individual accessions,
the standard commitment on export restrictions that has
emerged is provided for in the Working Party Report of Oman:
“The representative of Oman confirmed that any export control
requirements remaining in place on the date of accession would
be fully consistent with WTO provisions, including those
100. China, Latvia, Mongolia, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, and Viet Nam.
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contained in Articles XI, XVII, XX and XXI of the GATT 1994.
The Working Party took note of this commitment.”101 The
different uses of quantitative restrictions continue to rivet
policy and academic focus in trade policy. The degree of interest
has been constant from the position expressed by the United
States Chief Trade Negotiator in 1949:
Quantitative restrictions present the major issue of commercial policy
. . . . If uncontrolled, they promise to become universal and
permanent. Freedom to employ them is not readily to be surrendered.
The proposal that this freedom be limited evoked a debate that went
on for many months. The toughest problem in the trade negotiations
came to be known by its initials: Q.R. It would not be inaccurate to
describe the meetings in London, Geneva, and Havana as the United
Nations Conferences on Q.R.102

Overall, in this area of export restrictions, export duties,
charges, and taxes the consideration has been that accession
acquis in these areas have strengthened the disciplines and
rules. The trade policy community has noted that WTO
accessions have created and will continue to create disciplines
on export restrictions and export duties that complement the
GATT 1994.103
Customs valuation is an area strongly associated with
trade reform and the benefits of openness to trade. RAMs have
accepted commitments to implement GATT Article VII
(establishing the transaction value, as the primary basis for the
determination of customs value, and eliminating minimum
prices, reference prices and fixed valuation methods).104
Commitments undertaken include implementation of Article
VIII.105 Commitment to the implementation of Article X bound
RAMs to the transparency obligation and the establishment of
judicial, arbitral, administrative tribunals, or procedures for
the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review and correction of
101. Working Party on the Accession of Oman, Report of the Working Party
on the Accession of Oman to the World Trade Organization, para. 77 ,
WT/ACC/OMN/26 (Sept. 28, 2000).
102. CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE, 82 (1972) cited in
ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 31 n.29 (2d ed.
2008).
103. Jeonghoi Kim, Recent Trends in Export Restrictions (Org. for Econ.
Cooperation and Dev., Trade Policy Working Papers, No: 101, 2010).
104. See Working Party on the Accession of China, Report of the Working
Party on the Accession of China, para. 140, WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Oct. 1, 2001).
105. Specifically, Article VIII requires that fees and charges for exports and
important approximate the costs of services rendered. See GATT art. VIII.
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administrative action relating to customs matters. Although
there have been variations depending on the particular
situation of the acceding government, the commitment
language accepted by Viet Nam is illustrative:
The representative of Viet Nam confirmed that, from the date of
accession, Viet Nam would fully apply the WTO provisions
concerning customs valuation, including the Agreement on the
Implementation of Article VII of the GATT 1994 and Annex I
(Interpretative Notes). Viet Nam would ensure that any customs
valuation method to be applied would be in accordance with these
WTO rules. In this regard, he confirmed that minimum prices and
any system of reference prices or fixed valuation schedule applied to
imports in lieu of the transaction value to determine customs
valuation had been eliminated and would not be reintroduced and that
all methods of valuation used were in strict conformity with those
provided for in the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement. . . . The
Working Party took note of these commitments.106

The related areas of state trading entities, state ownership,
and privatization have been fundamental to sustainable
reform, more so for economies, especially developing economies
shifting from command to open markets. Reforms in these
areas, pursuant to the WTO accession process have assisted
developing countries’ momentum toward trade reform and
openness. The commitment languages accepted by China and
Viet Nam, two developing countries, are illustrative. In the
case of China:
The representative of China further confirmed that China would
ensure that all state-owned and state-invested enterprises would make
purchases and sales based solely on commercial considerations,
e.g., price, quality, marketability and availability, and that the
enterprises of other WTO Members would have an adequate
opportunity to compete for sales to and purchases from these
enterprises on non-discriminatory terms and conditions. In addition,
the Government of China would not influence, directly or indirectly,
commercial decisions on the part of state-owned or state-invested
enterprises, including on the quantity, value or country of origin of
any goods purchased or sold, except in a manner consistent with the
WTO Agreement. The Working Party took note of these
commitments.107

106. Working Party on the Accession of Viet Nam, Report of the Working
Party on the Accession of Viet Nam, para. 238, WT/ACC/VNM/48 (Oct. 27,
2006).
107. Working Party on the Accession of China, supra note 104, para. 49.
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And in the case of Viet Nam, similar, if not identical
language was accepted.108
The biggest challenge for accession-induced reforms,
entailed the transition from the centrally-planned (including
former socialist systems) to market-driven economies,
particularly through commitments to comply with GATT
Article XVII109 and transparency commitments on privatization
programs. The commitment language by China, as a developing
country, with regard to Article XVII provisions on State
Trading Enterprises is illustrative.110
Although there are no GATT/WTO rules on privatization, a
vicious circle has emerged, induced by accession negotiations
specifically in the context of the accession dialogue on state
ownership and state trading. Seventeen RAMs111 accepted
accession terms according to which they agreed to provide
periodic reports (essentially notifications) to WTO Members to
ensure the transparency of their privatization programs.112 The
commitment language by Cambodia, a LDC, is illustrative:
108. Working Party on the Accession of Viet Nam, supra note 106, para. 78.
The representative of Viet Nam confirmed that Viet Nam would ensure that
all enterprises that were State-owned or State-controlled, including equitized
enterprises in which the State had control, and enterprises with special or
exclusive privileges, would make purchases, not for governmental use, and
sales in international trade, based solely on commercial considerations, for
example, price, quality, marketability, and availability, and that the
enterprises of other WTO Members would have an adequate opportunity in
accordance with customary business practice to compete for participation in
sales to and purchases from these enterprises on non-discriminatory terms
and conditions. In addition, the Government of Viet Nam would not influence,
directly or indirectly, commercial decisions on the part of enterprises that are
State-owned, State-controlled, or that have special and exclusive privileges,
including decisions on the quantity, value or country of origin of any goods
purchased or sold, except in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement
and the rights accorded to non-governmental enterprise owners or
shareholders. The Working Party took note of these commitments.
109. GATT Article XVII, which outlines the rule on State Trading
Enterprises (STEs), directs that STEs shall not discriminate for governmental
measures affecting imports and exports by private traders and requires STEs
to act solely in accordance with commercial considerations. See GATT art.
XVII.
110. See supra text accompanying note 107.
111. Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chinese Taipei,
Croatia, Estonia, FYROM, Georgia, Kyrgz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania,
Moldova, Mongolia, Saudi Arabia, and Ukraine.
112. E.g., Press Release, World Trade Org., WTO Welcomes Ukraine as a
New Member (Feb. 5, 2008) http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres08_e/pr511
_e.htm.
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The representative of Cambodia stated that his Government would
ensure the transparency of its ongoing privatization programme and
would keep WTO Members informed of progress in the reform of its
economic and trade regimes. He stated that his Government would
provide periodic reports to WTO Members on developments in its
programme of privatization as long as the privatization programme
would be in existence, along the lines of that already provided to the
Working Party. He also stated that his Government would provide
periodic reports on other issues related to its economic reform as
relevant to its obligations under the WTO. The Working Party took
note of these commitments.113

In several ongoing accessions affecting formerly centrally
planned economies, the privatization trend and disposition to
provide information on privatization programs has been
maintained. For example, the Serbian delegation informed
WTO Members:
The privatization of commercial companies that began in 2001
continues in this year as well. . . . One of the major goals of the
Serbian Government is the finishing of the process of privatisation of
remaining socially owned enterprises, as well as introducing
competition into markets of infrastructure and public utilities. From
the beginning of the process of privatization until September 2010,
the total number of privatized enterprises amounted to 2414. These
efforts go hand in hand with necessary legal reforms aimed, inter alia,
at improving the business climate.114

Dual pricing has been one of the sources of distortions in
the global economy. Through the terms of accession some of the
larger economies with the capacity to affect the global economy
have addressed this issue. In the China accession terms:
The representative of China further confirmed that China would
provide the same treatment to Chinese enterprises, including foreignfunded enterprises, and foreign enterprises and individuals in China.
China would eliminate dual pricing practices as well as differences in
treatment accorded to goods produced for sale in China in
comparison to those produced for export. The Working Party took
note of these commitments.115

Accession negotiations and terms of membership have
induced sustained domestic reforms that have set a clear
direction towards the market economy. These reforms have
113. Working Party on the Accession of Cambodia, Report of the Working
Party on the Accession of Cambodia, para. 25, WT/ACC/KHM/21 (Aug. 15,
2003).
114. Vesna Arsic, State Sec’y, Statement at the 9th Meeting of the Working
Party on the Accession of the Republic of Serbia to the World Trade
Organization 4 (Oct. 20, 2010) (transcript on file with the author).
115. Working Party on the Accession of China, supra note 104, para. 18.
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been clearly reflected in accession terms for the determination
of price comparability in anti-dumping pursuant to the
Agreement on the Implementation of GATT Article VI (the
Anti-Dumping Agreement).116 Market economy status has been
central in accession terms for addressing subsidies pursuant to
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
Both China and Viet Nam’s terms of action committed
producers in the acceding governments to show the prevalence
of market economy conditions with the additional requirement
that those conditions satisfy the importing Member’s national
law. For instance, with regard to China accession terms, in its
Protocol, China undertook the commitment that:
(a) In determining price comparability under Article VI of the GATT
1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the importing WTO
Member shall use either Chinese prices or costs for the industry
under investigation or a methodology that is not based on a strict
comparison with domestic prices or costs in China based on the
following rules:
(i) If the producers under investigation can clearly show that
market economy conditions prevail in the industry producing the like
product with regard to the manufacture, production and sale of that
product, the importing WTO Member shall use Chinese prices or
costs for the industry under investigation in determining price
comparability;
(ii) The importing WTO Member may use a methodology that
is not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in
China if the producers under investigation cannot clearly show that
market economy conditions prevail in the industry producing the like
product with regard to manufacture, production and sale of that
product.117

Across the entire area of accession negotiations, acceding
governments have accepted commitments, backed up by
domestic legislation, confirming acceptance of GATT rules.
Additionally they have complemented, reinforced and, in some
areas, extended these rules, while regarding the particular
circumstance of the acceding government. These commitments
have strengthened the MFN principle, the transparency rule,
and set a clear direction for sustained market reforms and
trade opening.
A horizontal issue emphasized by other commentators is
that accession terms have not taken account of development
116. See id. para. 178.
117. Id. at 73.
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needs and circumstance. The facts indicate that although
accession terms have neither explicitly ascribed development
status, with the exception of LDCs, nor allowed ex ante
deviations from the rules on account of development status,
accession negotiations have taken account of development
needs in specific ways. This is reflected by the LDCs’ Accession
Guidelines,118 action plan-based transitional time frames for
acceding governments to implement their commitments, and
the set de minimis levels for Aggregate Measurement of
Support (AMS) directing developing country domestic support
for agriculture.119 In the case of Jordan, WTO Members in the
Working Party took particular account of the development
circumstance of Jordan for purposes of Article 6.4 in the
Agreement on Agriculture. In setting the AMS reduction
commitment for Jordan over a seven-year period, Members,
“also considered that for the purposes of Article 6.4 of the WTO
Agriculture Agreement, Jordan was a developing country.”120
In the course of accession negotiations, Members have
ensured that acceding governments accept commitments to the
existing rules. These commitments require acceptance of the
rules-plus (in several instances) and enactment of domestic
legislation that provides statutory backing for these
commitments. Part of the accession package is a Legislative
Action Plan. Trade-relevant legislation is deposited with the
WTO Secretariat for review by Members. This strong
legislative foundation was largely absent for the different
specific areas of WTO rules for many founding WTO Members,
including developing countries. Transparency and greater
openness in trade have been associated with faster growth.
In reviewing the impact of their WTO accession, RAMs
have repeatedly stressed its positive effects on the rule of law,
domestic coordination for trade policymaking (frequently
absent or minimal prior to the accession process), trade118. See General Council, Accession of Least-Developed Countries,
WT/L/508 (Jan. 20, 2003).
119. In accordance with the rules in the Agreement on Agriculture, the de
minimis levels are 5% for developed countries and 10% for developing
countries, with LDCs not subject to reduction commitments in domestic
support. See Marrakesh Agreement Annex 1A.
120. Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, Report of the Working
Party on the Accession of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the World Trade
Organization, para. 189, WT/ACC/JOR/33 (Dec. 3, 1999).
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opening, and the predictability of trade and investment. In
spite of the complexities and rigors of the WTO accession
process, representatives of RAMs have acknowledged the high
value of the accession process, as a necessary instrument for
their domestic policy reform, specifically for economy-boosting
trade liberalization.121 In a recent statement, the RAMs, as a
group, stated:
[A]s Members of the RAMs group we have always strongly
advocated that the accession of new Members to the WTO, including
developing countries and in particular LDCs, continues to broaden
the scope of trade covered under WTO disciplines. Universal
membership in the WTO is a critical factor in the establishment of a
strong rules-based trading system. We therefore call for the
expeditious accession process for developing countries and in
particular LDCs. . . .122

Individual RAMs have also evaluated the impact of their
WTO accession on their trade performance and welfare. Saudi
Arabia recently stated:
What we have seen as the consequence of Saudi Arabia’s accession
to the World Trade Organization at the end of 2005 is . . . the
acceleration of growth rates—almost a doubling of the rate of
growth. With it has come an in foreign investment in Saudi
Arabia. . . . The investments that are taking place in the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia will generate jobs and they are generating jobs.123

Taking account of periods of global financial and economic
crises, recession and domestic turmoil within countries, trade
data (provided below) suggest that RAMs achieved significant
gains in trade performance with more stable performance,
following their accession-related domestic reforms and trade
liberalization, compared to the pre-accession reform period.
The trade data indicate that the international trade of all
RAMs increased significantly as they started to implement
their accession-related reforms, some of these pre-accession,
others upon accession, and some through agreed phased
121. Confirmed by numerous conversations with representatives of RAMs
from Cambodia, China, Viet Nam, Cape Verde. See also World Trade
Organization, Ministerial Conference 7th Session, Round Table Statement on
the Least-Developed Countries’ Accessions, WT/MIN(09)/1 (Oct. 5, 2009).
122. WTO General Council, 21 October 2010. Remarks by the
Representatives of Chinese Taipei, on behalf of the Group of Recently Acceded
Members (RAMs).
123. Ambassador Adel Al-Jubeir, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the
United States, Remarks at the NCUSAR Annual Conference (Oct. 21, 2010),
http://www.saudiembassy.net/announcement/announcement10221001.aspx.
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transition. Figure VI and Annex 2 show that from 1995124 to
2009, the value of merchandise trade grew at average annual
rates of 13%, while Figure VII and Annex 3 show that trade in
commercial services grew by 11%. These average annual
growth rates were much faster in comparison to the growth of
world merchandise trade at 7% and services at 8%. Between
1995 and 2008125 the value of merchandise trade of all RAMs
rose by approximately 500% in contrast to world trade that
increased by about 200%.
Figure VI: Value of merchandise trade of all RAMs and
developing country or territory RAMs: 1995-2009126
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124. The establishment of the World Trade Organization was in 1995.
125. This period saw growth prior to the effects of the global economic and
financial crisis of 2008–09.
126. Twenty-five RAMs minus Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
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Figure VII: Value of trade in services of all RAMs and
developing country or territory RAMs: 1995-2009
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This positive trade performance was also reflected in the
share of world merchandise trade of RAMs, which significantly
increased from 6 to 12% during 1995–2009 as seen in Figure
VIII.
Figure VIII: RAMs’ share of world merchandise trade: 19952009127(Billion dollars and percentage)
1995

2009
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RAMs,
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World,
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World,
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127. Figures incorporating 2009 data reflect the trade collapse experienced
as a result of the 2008–2009 global financial and economic crisis, making
RAMs’ growth all the more significant.
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For the merchandise exports of the LDCs recently acceded
Members, between the year of their individual accessions and
the most recent figures available (2009), there is a varied
picture as seen in Figure IX(A). A significant percentage
change was registered for Cambodia at 63%, which acceded in
2004, with a modest positive change for Cape Verde at 10%,
which acceded in 2008, the year the global economic crisis
began, and a negative merchandise export for Nepal at -12%,
which acceded in 2004.
Figure IX (A): Value of merchandise exports of RAMs
that acceded as LDCs: 1995-2009
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For the non-LDCs recently acceded developing Members,
between the year of their individual accessions and the most
recent figures available (2009), significant percentage changes
were registered. Ecuador, which acceded in 1996, experienced a
164% change and Panama, which acceded in 1997, experienced
a 22% change, as seen in Figure IX (B).
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Figure IX (B): Value of merchandise exports of
Ecuador and Panama: 1995-2009
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Between the year of its accession (2005) and 2008, the
percentage change for the merchandise export of Saudi Arabia
was 73%, a growth differential that was cut to 4% when
analyzed from the year of accession to 2009 at the height of the
economic crisis. Oman, which acceded in 2000, registered a
percentage change in merchandise exports of 134% between its
accession year and 2009 as seen in Figure IX (C).
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Figure IX (C): Value of merchandise exports of Saudi
Arabia and Oman: 1995-2009
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Viet Nam registered a percentage change of 29% in
merchandise export between its year of accession in 2007 and
2008, a differential that was cut to 16% when analyzed from
the accession year to 2009. China, which acceded in 2001,
registered a percentage change in merchandise exports of 437%
between its accession year and 2008, but experienced a
decrease in its growth rate down to 352% in 2009 compared to
the year of its accession as seen in Figure IX (D).
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Figure IX (D): Value of merchandise exports of
China and Viet Nam: 1995-2009
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Overall, the results and momentum generated from
accession-driven domestic reforms and liberalization have been
clearly reflected in the better than average trade performance
of RAMs compared with founding WTO Members. Only RAMs
that have experienced domestic political difficulties have seen
the nullification of the effects of domestic economic reforms for
trade opening. WTO accession process and corresponding
commitments to GATT/WTO rules have provided a strong
impetus for developing countries to create their own reform
momentum, improve their trade growth performance, and
provide institutional reinforcement for the WTO in market
access and rule terms.
Furthermore, the behavior of RAMs has influenced the
agenda and contemporary functioning of the WTO in two ways.
First, RAMs have explicitly accepted the standard rules and
the “rules plus” in their terms of accession. Second, although
RAMs have held a defensive line in the Doha Round
negotiations, beyond what they judge as their already
substantial tariff concessions and specific commitments in their
bilateral market accession negotiations, most RAMs have been
proactive in pushing current acceding governments to lower
levels of protection. RAMs have also maintained the line that
the Doha Round should build on the foundation and the results
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of accession negotiations, pursuant to Article XII of the
Marrakesh Agreement.
One of the original insights by Hudec was that
governments, under liberal trade policy regimes, need the same
sort of powers to resist protectionist demands as those
advocated by infant industry proponents for government
intervention to improve on imperfect market outcomes.128
Consequently, Hudec argued that by using constraining
procedures established by multilateral rules, governments
could acquire greater control over policy and substantially
increase welfare gains.129 “Far from diminishing sovereignty,
such legal restraints would increase it.”130 This lucid and
logical argument is now frequently used to show that the
constraints in multilateral rules and disciplines assist in
locking-in welfare-increasing domestic reforms. Because trade
policymaking is subject to the political economy, interventionist
policies are almost impossible to control. A question to which
Hudec drew attention was the necessity of ensuring that
prudent and correct judgments are made about where and
when to intervene.131 The accession process and results not
only provide support for this argument, namely that
multilateral rules help governments lock-in domestic reforms,
but also demonstrate that the process and results were critical
in generating momentum for trade liberalization in developing
RAMs and economies in transition.
VI. CONCLUSION
From the mid-1980s there was a change in the trade policy
behavior of developing countries. They embarked on farreaching domestic policy reforms and trade liberalization. This
behavior was neither collective, nor organized group behavior.
There were differences in timing, pace, depth, and focus in
these reforms. Collectively observed, the trade policy behavior
of developing countries has reflected both fast-clipped, offensive
trade liberalizing behavior and, at the same time, defensive
128. Professor Hudec’s argument was in relation to GATT Article XVIII
and he was always clear that governments must always refuse to undertake
wasteful investments. See HUDEC, supra note 2.
129. See id. at 175
130. Id.
131. See id. at 144–51.
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postures that border on protection. Uniform characterization
has been limited by the heterogeneity of the group.
Nonetheless, the facts demonstrate that in contrast to the trade
policy behavior in the 1960s GATT era reflecting protectionism,
industrial policy behavior, exemption orientations from
systemic trading rules and non-market systems, developing
countries that committed to domestic reforms and trade
liberalization have had significant economic payoffs. They have
grown faster than the traditional trading nations. They have
recovered quicker from crisis. They are now considered by
development economists as the “global growth locomotives.”132
They have demonstrated greater ambition in the long-standing
and most distorted areas of negotiations in the Doha Round,
although they seek flexibilities in other areas and reflect
caution in such areas as financial services liberalization. What
factors explain the domestic reforms and the shift to trade
liberalizing behavior in those developing countries that
embarked on these reforms? What have been the implications
of this trade liberalizing behavior and its significant positive
economic pay-offs for developing countries in their relationship
with developed country counterparts?
A combination of domestic and external factors, including
the role of personalities who managed these reforms, explains
the drive to reform and trade liberalization in developing
countries. In the 1980s, developing countries reversed 1960s
and 1970s protectionist policies and an exemption orientation
from GATT rules and shifted to an ambitious reformist agenda.
This imperative reform agenda was implemented in response to
the 1980s growth shock crises133 and recession, domestic
development priorities, and multilateral reform pressures from
the 1986 launch of the Uruguay Round. This liberalization
momentum was sustained by the changing global political
economy highlighted by the emergence of democracy in Latin
America, the collapse of the socialist experiment of command
economies and the consequent transition to market economies.
Current analysis has accorded insufficient weight to the
effect of the multilateral rules and institutions in modifying the
132. See Canuto, supra note 56, at 1, 4.
133. These crises included the second oil shock (1979–81), the inability of
Mexico to service its debt, increased interest rates in the United States meant
to reduce double-digit inflation, and the ensuing global recession.
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domestic behavior of leaders. The effect of the rules-based
Multilateral Trading System in particular has been
underestimated. The architecture of the WTO has operated to
secure rule-compliant, trade-reformist behavior and exercised
systemic constraints on individual Members to check and
counter protectionism. This architecture rests on the pillars of
enforceable rules, under the DSU, periodic Trade Policy
Reports and monitoring reports, within the framework of the
TPRM, and the accumulating effects of the terms of accession of
RAMs, pursuant to Article XII accession negotiations. This
architecture, renovated by periodic trade rounds, has acted in
combination with domestic growth priorities, in developing
countries, to generate and sustain the momentum for trade
liberalization.
Always at risk of inertia, rollback, or protectionist
encroachment, the Multilateral Trading System has relied on
successive rounds of trade negotiations to inject momentum,
sustain further trade liberalization, or keep protectionism at
bay. Trade rounds combined with recourse to the DSU, Trade
Policy Reviews, terms of accession, and the regular functioning
of the rules-based system, have generated constant multilateral
energy for reform, liberalization, and compliance with extant
rules, particularly in developing countries.
There are three recent examples of trade reform policy
behavior by developing countries, inspired by the unique trade
liberalizing and anti-protectionist WTO architecture. These are
i) the Indian proposal on Strengthening the WTO; ii) virtually
unanimous developing country support for the monitoring
process initiated by the WTO Director-General in 2008,
reporting on developments associated with the financial and
economic crisis, to ensure that markets remain open for global
recovery; and iii) the African Sectoral Initiative on Cotton,
which invokes trade rules to challenge United States domestic
support in the cotton sector. Yet, trade opening behavior has
not been uniform and consistent. There is also the learned
behavior of developing countries, illustrated in the numerical
increase in the use of trade defense mechanisms with
protectionist effects. For instance, between 1995 and 2009,
developing countries reported 1,604 anti-dumping measures in
comparison to 770 such measures by developed countries.
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The WTO accession process is one of the most powerful
explanations for domestic reforms and trade liberalization in
developing countries. The results of these accessions provide
critical insight into reforms in about twenty-five WTO RAMs.
Unfortunately, general analysis of the results of these
accessions has narrowly and exclusively focused on the issue of
costs divorced from the broader immediate and longer-term
effects for trade performance and growth. Across specific areas
of coverage of Article XII accession negotiations,134 acceding
governments have accepted commitments, backed-up by
domestic legislation that have confirmed acceptance of extant
GATT rules, and gone further to complement, reinforce and, in
some areas, extend these rules adapted to the particular
circumstance of the acceding government. These commitments
have strengthened the MFN principle, concretely improved
trade openness and transparency, set a clear direction for
sustained market reforms and trade opening and, have not
undermined the non-discrimination principle. The results and
momentum generated from WTO accession-driven domestic
reforms and liberalization have been clearly reflected in the
better than average trade performance of RAMs in contrast to
founding WTO Members, with the exception of those instances
where domestic political difficulties have nullified the effect of
reform and trade opening. Controlling for periods of financial
and economic crises, recession, and domestic turmoil, trade
data indicate that RAMs achieved significant gains in trade
performance with more stable performance following their
accession-related domestic reforms and trade liberalization,
compared to the pre-accession reform period.135 The analyzed
trade data indicate that the international trade of all RAMs
increased significantly as they started to implement their
accession-related reforms, some of these pre-accession, others
upon accession, and some through agreed phased transition.
From 1995 to 2009, their value of merchandise trade grew at
average annual rates of 13%, while trade in commercial
services grew by 11%. These average annual growth rates were
much faster in comparison to the growth of world merchandise
trade at 7% and services at 8% in the same period. In the
period between 1995 and 2008, the value of merchandise trade
134. See supra p. 404.
135. See supra pp. 417–24.
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of all RAMs rose by approximately 500%, in contrast to world
trade that increased by approximately 200%.
As trade liberalization and domestic reforms have
proceeded apace in developing countries, some of these
countries, within a diverse group, insist on differentiated
treatment. There have been suggestions that special and
differential treatment has undermined the principle of nondiscrimination. Non-discrimination is positively associated with
openness and competition and also explains, in part, the
liberalizing behavior of developing countries. Policy-wise there
are serious misgivings about the accumulating effects of
differentiated treatment in a system of legally enforceable rules
and disciplines. Systemic vigilance and monitoring is required
to ensure that the value of predictable rules and disciplines are
not eroded. However, legally, WTO jurisprudence demonstrates
that special and differential treatment has not undermined the
foundation principle of non-discrimination. The trade policy
behavior of Members, including developing Members, has been
significantly influenced by WTO DSU jurisprudence and
systemic rules. The jurisprudence and the rules have
consistently upheld the non-discrimination principle. Both the
jurisprudence, on questions addressed, and Members’ rules
recognize that differentiation in treatment may be applied, as
exceptions and without such differentiation undermining the
foundation non-discrimination principle. For instance, in
European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of
Preferences to Developing Countries (EC—Tariff Preferences),
the Appellate Body (AB) upheld the Panel’s finding that the
1979 Enabling Clause is an exception to GATT Article I.1.136
However, the AB also concluded that in granting differential
tariff treatment, in accordance with non-discrimination,
preference-granting countries are “required . . . to ensure that
identical treatment is available to all similarly-situated GSP
beneficiaries . . . that have the ‘development, financial and
trade needs’ to which the treatment in question is intended to

136. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Conditions for the
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr.
7, 2004).
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respond.”137 Differential treatment has also been addressed
through Article IX waivers.138
Notwithstanding the trade reform agenda of developing
countries, LDCs in particular, within the developing country
group, maintain demands for specific rule exemptions.
Different categories of non-LDC low income countries seek
differentiated rule and market access treatment and developing
countries in general seek policy space and rule flexibility.
On the foundation of far-reaching reforms and strong
economic performance, a group of emerging economies led by
Brazil, China, and India have become locomotives for recovery
and growth in the global economy. Their role is critical in
coordinated efforts with the post-World War II traditional
economies of the United States, the EU27, and Japan in
addressing global macroeconomic balances. The cooperative
negotiating engagement of these two groups of countries is
indispensable in resolving the disagreements and sorting out
the trading rules under the Doha Round to govern trade
relations in the twenty-first century. The absence of agreement
is reflected in the progress and reversals in the Doha Round
over the past ten years, with effective deadlock since July
2008.139 The relationship between developed and developing
countries is captured by the situation in the Doha Round. It is a
complex relationship, explained by historic shifts in the global
balance of trade and economic power. Tensions, disagreements
and conflicts are being played out in the Doha Round. The
emerging economies are calling for a greater stake in the rules137. Id. para. 173.
138. Three examples are helpful. First, the Doha Decision on waiver for
EC-ACP partnership agreement waiving EC obligation under GATT Article
1.1, with respect to the granting of preferential treatment for products
originating from ACP States (waiver was until December 31, 2007). See World
Trade Organization, European Communities—the ACP-EC Partnership
Agreement, WT/MIN(01)/15 (Nov. 14, 2001). Second, the 2001 Decision on
Transitional Regime for Banana imports, based on the European
Communities’ waiver request from its obligations under GATT Article XIII
paragraphs 1 and 2. See World Trade Organization, European Communities—
Transitional Regime for the EC Autonomous Tariff Rate Quotas on Imports of
Bananas, WT/MIN(01)/16 (Nov. 14, 2001). Third, the Waiver for the United
States African Growth and Opportunity Act which was granted on May 27,
2009 and is in effect until September 30, 2015. See United State—African
Growth and Opportunity Act, WT/L/754 (May 29, 2009).
139. E.g., Giles, Beattie & Oliver, Leaders Warn on Doha Deadlock,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 11, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dde10ee6-edb311df-9612-00144feab49a.html#axzz1EnnmUBqB.
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based system, commensurate with their enhanced trade and
economic standings on the foundation of ambitious reforms.
The response of the developed Members is that a higher stake
in an adjusted rules-based Multilateral Trading System, that
provides greater accommodation to the emergent economies,
entails acceptance of increased responsibility and greater
leadership to support the system. For instance, the United
States in responding to allegations of unrealistic Doha Round
proposals countered: “What is not realistic is the notion that a
few of the world’s most powerful trading nations can play by a
set of rules that gives them largely unfettered access to global
markets—without giving appropriate reciprocity in return.”140
In its view, this was neither a basis for a sustainable trading
system nor an appropriate outcome for the Doha Round.141
There is an urgency to Doha Round completion to, inter
alia, address the complex and evolving relationship between
the developed and developing countries. The high income
emerging economies are integrated into the global economy,
ascendant and growing faster than the traditional economic
powers. The low and middle-income developing countries
require assistance for their continued integration into the
rules-based Multilateral Trading System. The value of the
Doha Round has been typically assessed in terms of the value
of what is on the table, with welfare estimates of between
US$43 billion and US$300 billion.142 However, the value of the
Doha Round is much more than the welfare calculations.143 Not
only are their considerable welfare gains, there are also
systemic benefits. Even more, this paper has argued that there
are yet more enduring gains embedded in the long-term
140. Ambassador Michael Punke, U.S. Permanent Rep. to the World Trade
Org., Statement to the Trade Negotiations Committee (Nov. 30, 2010)
http://geneva.usmission.gov/2010/11/30/statement-by-ambassador-punke-tothe-trade-negotiations-committee/.
141. See id.
142. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Address at the Workshop on Recent
Analyses of the Doha Round (Nov. 2, 2010). See also Hoekman, Martin &
Mattoo, Conclude Doha: It Matters!, 9 WORLD TRADE REVIEW 505–30 (2010).
143. See generally Hoekman, Martin & Mattoo, supra note 142, at 514 (The
Doha Round offers “market access” trade facilitation and “the aid for trade
initiative.”); Pascal Lamy, Director-General, World Trade Org., Speech at the
10th Anniversary of the World Trade Institute: The Changing Patterns of
World Trade (Oct. 1, 2010) (“What is at stake is more than the economic
benefits that would flow from a successful Doha deal. The real issue is the
relevance of the multilateral trading system itself.”).
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management of the relationship between the traditional
trading powers and the emergent economies of China, Brazil,
India, and others. This relationship requires periodic
adjustments through successive rounds of trade negotiations.
As painful as they may be, there is a permanent rationale to
trade rounds. Trade Rounds not only address specific trade and
economic difficulties, but also provide a forum for necessary
periodic adjustments in the ever-changing global balance in
trade and economic power.
All Members and negotiating coalitions have a role to play
in trade rounds. But, every negotiation requires critical, driving
leadership by a core group of Members. The leadership reflects
a combination of major-trader status, emergent powers, and an
institutional understanding of the vital importance of
multilateral institutions to manage changes in global order. In
the immediate post–World War II era, this role was played by
the United States. Canada, the EU, and Japan were to join in
the famous, productive and successful QUAD leadership of the
Multilateral Trading System in the GATT, up until just before
the launch of the Uruguay Round in 1986. This world has
dramatically changed. While the role of the traditional traders
in the QUAD remain vital new, powerful, and ascendant
economies have emerged. Brazil, China and India are preeminent. In August 2010, China became the second largest
economy in the world,144 and as of 2009 India is the fifth largest
and Brazil the tenth largest. These robust and dynamic,
developing economies and the traditional economies will need
to work more effectively, imaginatively and cooperatively on
the Doha Round.
The WTO is a permanent negotiating forum, where
Members agree to the rules that regulate global trade. Its rules
are enforceable. It operates a dispute settlement system that
adjudicates trade differences that arise between Members. It is
a global public good, providing benefits that cannot be supplied
by other institutions. If this system of rules did not exist, it
would have to be created. The global public advantage of the
WTO was evident during the 2008–2009 global economic and
financial crisis. It was widely acknowledged that protectionism
144. See David Barboza, China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/business/globa
l/16yuan.html.
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did not break out, despite the recession and high levels of
unemployment, because of the restraining effect of the rules of
the WTO and its monitoring oversight. Both the WTO, as an
international organization, and the Doha Round, as a
negotiating engagement, are vital in managing the enduring
questions surrounding the relationship between traditional and
emergent trading powers, a question put on the agenda in Bob
Hudec’s classic.

